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EDITORIAL
Economic growth in the euro area is now 
gathering momentum, after moderating in 
the first half of the year. Estimates for the 
third quarter indicate that GDP growth is 
above potential, and leading indicators point 
to continued solid growth in the months to 
come.  
External trade continues to be an important 
driver of growth in the euro area. Exports in 
the third quarter expanded at the fastest 
pace since the end of 2000, reflecting 
buoyant world trade and competitiveness 
gains following the depreciation of the euro 
since the beginning of 2005.  
There are now also signs that domestic 
demand is at last strengthening, with a 
marked recovery in business confidence 
contributing to a strong acceleration in 
investment growth. The pick-up in private 
consumption has been more gradual, 
reflecting the effect of higher oil prices on 
disposable income and subdued consumer 
confidence. Overall, the risks to the short-
term growth outlook appear more balanced 
than three months ago. 
Substantial and lasting increases in oil prices 
over the last two years have given rise to 
concerns about rising inflation. One of the 
focus sections of this report shows that 
higher oil prices have indeed had a 
significant direct effect on the energy 
component of the HICP since the 
beginning of the year.  
Indirect effects of higher oil prices, which 
occur when producers pass through higher 
input costs into their final prices, have been 
slow to materialise but are beginning to be 
felt and could exert significant upward 
pressures on inflation in the euro area in the 
year to come. However, the impact on 
overall inflation has been limited due to the 
lagged effect of past exchange-rate 
appreciation and moderate growth in unit 
labour costs.  
Second-round effects, meanwhile, which 
depend on the response of wage bargainers 
and price setters, have been muted. 
However, there is a low, but not 
insignificant risk, that they could be higher 
in Member States where labour market 
conditions are tight or where there are 
wage-indexation schemes. 
Looking ahead to the medium term, the 
euro area faces two major challenges. The 
first will be to allay widespread concerns 
over the perceived negative consequences of 
globalisation. One recurring concern, for 
example, is that increased import 
competition from low-wage countries puts 
too much pressure on European producers 
and workers and may result in factories 
being closed at home and economic 
activities being located abroad. 
However, a recent study by the European 
Commission, published in the EU Economy 
Annual Review 2005, suggests that many 
preconceptions about globalisation are ill-
founded. 
Firstly, it finds that about one fifth of the 
increase in living standards in the EU-15 
over the past 50 years can be attributed to 
Europe’s progressive integration with the 
world economy.  
Secondly, international trade and investment 
have not historically been associated with 
aggregate net employment losses at home, 
and there is also no indication that more 
open economies suffer from higher 
unemployment.  
Thirdly, deeper international integration 
does not appear to systematically exert 
downward pressure on the wage share in 
national income. Nor, despite some high-
profile cases, has globalisation led to a 
systematic erosion of working conditions. 
Fourthly, the outsourcing of business 
services has largely been matched by rising 
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exports. In fact, the EU has a healthy overall 
trade surplus in business-related services, 
equivalent to ½% of GDP in 2003. 
Nevertheless, public concerns over 
globalisation should not be dismissed too 
readily. In order to realise the full gains 
from globalisation and protect Europe’s 
share of world markets it will be crucial for 
the EU not only to consolidate its position 
in the medium-high-technology sectors but 
also to improve its position in a wider range 
of high-technology market segments – and 
the structural transformation process that 
this will entail could hit some people in 
certain sectors or regions hard.  
What is needed to facilitate the 
transformation process is an effective 
adjustment of the labour market – but high 
levels of long-term unemployment and 
relatively low labour mobility in many 
Member States indicate that the process is 
not running smoothly enough. One new 
initiative that, along with the structural 
funds and the European Social Fund, could 
help reduce the costs of change and 
facilitate transition is the Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund proposed by President 
Barroso at October’s Informal European 
Council at Hampton Court and endorsed by 
the European Council in December. 
But any strategy designed to make 
globalisation a win-win situation must 
include not just responsive labour markets 
and a well-trained and highly skilled 
workforce, but also a stable macroeconomic 
environment, efficient and integrated 
financial markets, an open and dynamic 
internal market including a genuine single 
market in services, improved access to third 
countries’ markets and an open multilateral 
trading system, underpinned by strong 
multilateral trade rules. The recent Hong 
Kong WTO Ministerial meeting provides a 
strong basis for moving forward with the 
current round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA). An ambitious DDA 
outcome will be integral to improving 
prospects for global growth and poverty 
reduction.  By including fast-growth sectors 
such as the service sector, this round has the 
potential to deliver even wider and deeper 
economic benefits to its participants.  
The second major issue on the euro-area’s 
medium-term agenda, and also discussed in 
the other focus section of this report, is how 
to meet the economic challenges posed by 
an ageing population. The number of 
people in the euro area aged 65 years and 
above relative to those aged between 15 and 
64 will have doubled by 2050. This means 
that the euro area will go from the current 
situation of four people of working-age for 
every elderly citizen to a ratio of two to one. 
Economically, this will result in a falling 
labour supply, lower growth in living 
standards and rising taxation and age-related 
expenditure – unless policies change.   
The good news is that policies are gradually 
beginning to change. In particular, the 
labour market reforms promoted by the 
Lisbon Strategy are contributing to rising 
employment rates by curtailing access to 
early retirement schemes, making work pay, 
raising statutory retirement ages and 
strengthening financial incentives in pension 
systems to delay retirement.  
However, we cannot rest on our laurels. 
Even if the euro area as a whole achieves 
the Lisbon employment targets (which in 
any case it will not do until after the original 
target date of 2010), this will not be 
sufficient to offset the economic effects of 
demographic change. Therefore, it will be 
necessary to develop a more ambitious set 
of labour-market and welfare-state policies 
that are sustainable in the face of uncertain 
economic and demographic developments. 
Longer life expectancy may pave the way for 
a possible expansion of the share of life 
spent in retirement. However, retirement 
decisions also need to be economically and 
financially viable. Flexible retirement ages 
adapting to a continuously increasing life 
expectancy may be the appropriate policy 
response. 
Klaus REGLING  
DIRECTOR GENERAL 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Economic activity is gaining momentum in the euro area. GDP growth accelerated to rates above potential in the third 
quarter, and leading indicators point to continued solid growth in the last months of 2005 and the beginning of 2006. 
Although private consumption is improving only very gradually, domestic demand is at last showing signs of strengthening on 
the back of a recovery in investment. External trade remains a key engine of growth as euro-area exporters benefit from a 
pick-up in world trade and in competitiveness gains resulting from the depreciation of the euro since the beginning of the year. 
Overall, risks to the short-tem outlook appear more balanced than three months ago.  
Continued favourable monetary and financial conditions are an important source of support to activity in the euro area at the 
current juncture. In particular, despite a recent increase, long-term interest rates in the euro area are extremely low compared 
with their levels over the past two decades. This reflects a combination of global and euro-area specific factors. Global factors 
that have weighed on interest rates in the USA as well as in the euro area include enhanced central bank credibility in 
constraining inflation, the existence of excess liquidity in the international financial system, the purchases of US Treasury 
bills by Asian central banks, underinvestment in the corporate sector and shifts in the investment strategies of pension funds 
due to population ageing. In addition, sluggish short-term growth prospects and downward revisions in potential growth have 
also contributed to lower yields in the euro area in recent years.  
 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects 1  
Domestic demand picking up 
The national-account estimates for the third 
quarter indicate that the recovery in the euro 
area is gaining momentum. After some 
moderation of economic activity in the first half 
of the year, GDP growth accelerated to 0.6% 
quarter-on-quarter in the third quarter, which is 
both above potential and in line with the 
Commission’s autumn 2005 forecast. Higher 
GDP growth was supported by an acceleration 
of growth in domestic demand (excluding 
inventories). The progressive acceleration in the 
rate of growth of domestic demand over the first 
three quarters of this year represents an 
important step towards a more balanced 
recovery in the euro area. The strong pick-up in 
demand in the industrial sector led to a sizeable 
depletion of inventories, which translated into 
the strongest negative contribution since the 
start of the current recovery. On the other hand, 
foreign demand made a positive contribution to 
growth, as exports picked up strongly.  
Among the larger euro-area Member States, 
Germany and France experienced particularly 
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 13 December. 
healthy growth rates of 0.6% and 0.7%, 
respectively, a clear improvement on the 
previous quarter. Economic activity in Spain 
sustained a robust pace of 0.8%. In contrast, 
following a stronger-than-expected pick-up in 
the second quarter of the year, GDP growth in 
Italy and the Netherlands remained more 
subdued (0.3%). Overall, notwithstanding the 
differences in growth rates across countries, the 
acceleration of economic activity was more 
broad-based in the third than in the second 
quarter.  
An examination of the main demand 
components reveals that, excluding inventories, 
domestic demand provided the main support to 
GDP growth in the euro area (0.6 pp). This was 
largely due to a significant pick-up in investment, 
which recorded its strongest increase in the last 
five years (1.6%) and contributed 0.3 pp to GDP 
growth. On the other hand, the performance of 
private consumption improved only marginally, 
adding 0.2 pp to GDP growth, while the 
contribution of public consumption remained 
unchanged at 0.1 pp. Economic activity was also 
stimulated by external trade. While net trade 
provided a slightly negative contribution to 
economic activity in the second quarter, it added 
0.3 pp to quarter-on-quarter GDP growth in the 
third quarter. 
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Sustained acceleration in investment 
In view of the sharp pick-up in business sector 
confidence since the middle of the year, the 
strong acceleration in investment growth in the 
third quarter was not surprising. The fact that 
gross fixed capital formation in each of the 
previous three quarters was also revised upwards 
confirms the underlying momentum of the 
revival in investment. 
The main factors supporting investment growth 
include improved corporate profitability and 
balance sheets and benign financing conditions. 
These elements, together with the depreciation 
of the euro exchange rate since the beginning of 
2005, have put the corporate sector in a strong 
position to take advantage of the ongoing global 
industrial recovery. Furthermore, following 
several years of negative investment growth, 
there is also an increasing need for replacement 
investment in the euro area. 
Data available in some Member States suggest 
that equipment investment was the main driving 
force behind the observed acceleration in the 
pace of gross fixed capital formation in the third 
quarter.2 This is especially evident in Germany, 
where equipment investment grew by 3.8% 
quarter-on-quarter. In Spain, where sustained 
investment growth had been supported by a 
construction boom, equipment investment 
                                                     
2  Data on the composition of investment for the euro area 
as a whole are not yet available for the third quarter. 
growth surged in the third quarter by 6.2% 
compared with the previous quarter, while 
construction investment took a pause. 
Investment in equipment was also a factor in the 
rebound of investment in France in the third 
quarter.  
Graph 1: Investment growth, euro area (1) 
(q-o-q change in % –  2003Q3 to 2005Q3) 
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(1) No breakdown available for 2005Q3. 
Source: Commission services. 
Although the general level of capacity utilisation 
in manufacturing is still below its long-term 
average, the strength of the global recovery in 
the manufacturing sector should underpin 
investment spending, which is projected in the 
Commission’s autumn forecast to be the main 
impulse behind the expected sustained recovery 
of euro-area domestic demand in 2006. 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2004 Q4 
2005 
Q1 
2005 
Q2 
2005 
Q3 
Carryover 
to 2005 2005 (2) 2006 (2) 
 Percentage change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.3 1.3 1.9 
Private consumption 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 
Government consumption -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.3 2.0 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.6 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.2 1.7 3.1 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.5 
Exports of goods and services 0.3 -0.8 2.2 3.4 4.0 3.4 5.0 
Imports of goods and services 1.4 -1.5 2.6 2.8 4.4 3.9 5.0 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Government consumption 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.6 
Changes in inventories 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Net exports -0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Autumn 2005 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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The positive outlook for investment is not 
confined to the equipment sector. The 
confidence indicator for the construction sector 
has improved noticeably since the summer. It 
registered a particularly strong increase in 
November, which brought its level significantly 
above its long-term average. The November 
increase was spearheaded by a marked 
strengthening of confidence in Spain, but the 
improvement in construction sector confidence 
was shared across most Member States. In 
particular, confidence in the German 
construction sector, which was on a chronic 
downward trend for a number of years, has 
improved significantly since the beginning of the 
year, and is now around its long-term average. 
Gradual improvement in consumption 
Following a rebound in the last quarter of 2004, 
private consumption growth slowed markedly 
during the first half of 2005 in the euro area. It 
grew by 0.1% in the first quarter and by 0.2% in 
the following quarter. It then accelerated slightly 
to 0.3% in the third quarter, but remains 
subdued. Factors behind its lacklustre 
performance include a still restrained level of 
consumer confidence and the pressure on 
household purchasing power caused by the rise 
in headline inflation (which picked up from 
1.9% in January to 2.6% in September and was 
still at 2.4% in November).  
Graph 2: Household confidence, the euro area  
(balance in %) 
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(1) Inverted scale. 
Source: Commission services. 
In a number of countries, indicators of 
consumer confidence suggest that households 
remain rather cautious in their spending. Despite 
some improvement in recent months, consumer 
confidence is still at the level observed at the 
beginning of the year and remains below its 
long-term average. This suggests that 
consumption by private households should not 
be expected to provide a strong boost to the 
economy in the near term. Consumers’ 
expectations of unemployment have improved 
since the summer, against the background of a 
decelerating but still high unemployment rate (at 
8.3% in November). However, consumers’ 
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2004-2005 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.9 0.00 2.83 52.1 54.3 95.6 -9.5 30.5 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.1 -1.25 -0.77 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
December 2004 99.6 0.40 1.34 51.4 52.7 96.4 -5.3 14.4 
January 2005 100.5 0.40 1.16 51.9 53.4 97.5 -5.0 26.9 
February 2005 98.5 0.20 0.78 51.9 53.0 96.3 -11.4 35.9 
March 2005 97.1 -0.10 0.24 50.4 53.0 94.6 -9.4 36.3 
April 2005 96.1 -0.30 -0.27 49.2 52.8 93.6 -15.9 20.1 
May 2005 96.1 -0.40 -0.47 48.7 53.5 92.4 -14.0 13.9 
June 2005 96.1 -0.30 -0.20 49.9 53.1 93.0 -14.3 19.5 
July 2005 97.3 -0.10 0.56 50.8 53.5 95.1 -13.8 37.0 
August 2005 97.6 -0.10 1.55 50.4 53.4 95.5 -14.1 50.0 
September 2005 98.4 0.10 2.40 51.7 54.7 95.5 -7.0 38.6 
October 2005 100.2 0.20  52.7 54.9 98.6 -6.0 39.4 
November 2005 99.9 0.10  52.8 55.2 97.7 -5.6 38.7 
December 2005        61.6 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly 
change. 4) Reuters Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, 
West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
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expectations concerning the economic situation 
over the next 12 months and, to a lesser extent, 
their financial situation have deteriorated since 
the middle of the year. Other indicators for 
household spending also suggest subdued 
consumption growth. Confidence in the retail 
trade sector has improved since the summer, but 
the November data were disappointing. The 
three-month moving average for the volume of 
retail sales in the euro area rose by a marginal 
0.1% in August-October over the previous 
three-month period.  
On a more positive side, the outlook for private 
consumption should gradually benefit from 
more dynamic job creation and falling 
unemployment. Business surveys have shown a 
noticeable improvement in companies’ 
employment expectations in the service sector 
since the summer. More recently, reported 
employment prospects have also increased 
slightly in the manufacturing sector. According 
to the Commission’s autumn 2005 economic 
forecasts, employment is expected to increase by 
1% this year and by 1.2% in 2006 as growth 
regains momentum. The unemployment rate is 
expected to fall further from an estimated 8.6% 
in 2005 to 8.4% in 2006. Sustained employment 
growth will boost real disposable income, the 
moderate growth of which (around 1% in annual 
terms over the past few years) has been the main 
factor behind the relative weakness of private 
consumption in this cycle.  
In addition, it is worth noting that the household 
saving rate interrupted its downward trend at the 
beginning of this decade and, after two years of 
increase in 2001-02, has remained broadly stable. 
These developments in the saving rate have 
further dampened consumption growth in the 
past few years. A number of factors may have 
led households to increase savings, including 
higher uncertainty due, inter alia, to geopolitical 
tensions, lack of clarity about the timing and 
scale of some structural reforms, and/or the 
lingering effects of past exceptional losses in 
equity holdings.3 While the saving rate of 
households in the euro area is projected to 
decline slightly over the forecast horizon (from 
14.4% in 2005 to 14.2% in 2007), this will not be 
                                                     
3  See ‘Consumption, Investment and Saving in the EU: an 
assessment’, DG ECFIN Occasional Paper No. 20, 
November 2005. 
sufficient to reverse the rise observed in 2001-
2002. 
Robust export growth 
Moving on to the external sector, exports 
expanded in the third quarter at the fastest pace 
since the fourth quarter of 2000. This evolution 
was supported by a depreciation of the exchange 
rate of the euro vis-à-vis the main trading 
partners of the euro-area countries (nominal 
effective exchange rate) and continued strong 
growth in world trade. Since the high point 
reached at the turn of the year (which coincided 
with its peak against the USD), the nominal 
effective exchange rate of the euro has fallen by 
around 6% against the currencies of the main 
trading partners. In line with the lagged 
relationship between the exchange rate and 
exports, this depreciation should continue to 
boost exports over the coming quarters. 
Graph 3: Euro-area exports by destination 
(Index of values in euro, sa, 2000=100,  
Jan 2000 to Aug 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The global environment has also provided 
support for exports. After the stagnation of the 
first quarter and the buoyancy of the second 
quarter, world trade grew at trend (an annualised 
rate of about 7%) in the third quarter, according 
to the latest CPB release. In addition, euro-area 
exports were probably boosted by the recycling 
of oil revenues, which was facilitated by the 
close trading links with oil-exporting countries, 
particularly countries from the former Soviet 
Union (see Graph 3). 
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Business indicators point to solid growth in 
the fourth quarter 
Short-term indicators for the business sector 
suggest that euro-area manufacturing activity has 
remained resilient in the fourth quarter, 
supported by a weaker euro, stabilising oil prices, 
persistently strong global demand and a revival 
of domestic demand. According to the 
European Commission survey, industrial 
confidence is currently above the level observed 
in the third quarter. As a result of its 
improvement between June and October, the 
Business Climate Indicator remains above its 
long-term average despite a slight decrease in 
November. Production expectations in the 
manufacturing sector have also strengthened 
further in the past few months. Reuters PMI for 
the euro-area manufacturing sector rose to 52.8 
in November, the highest level since September 
2004 and well above the threshold which 
separates expansion from contraction of 
manufacturing activity. The IFO index – which 
measures economic activity conditions in 
Germany – was weaker than expected in 
November, probably influenced by the proposed 
rise in VAT. Despite the correction, the index 
remains above the average of the previous 
quarter and is consistent with healthy GDP 
growth. 
Graph 4: Business confidence indicators, euro area 
(Jan 1999 to Nov 2005) 
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(1) Normalised. 
Source: Commission services. 
Recent service sector indicators support the view 
that the euro-area recovery is gaining 
momentum. After a decline in the first quarter 
of this year, the European Commission 
confidence indicator for services has increased 
since April approaching its long-term average. 
Sentiment in service sectors has been bolstered 
by an improving current business situation and, 
to a lesser degree, better demand expectations. 
The Reuters index for services continued to 
increase in October/November, suggesting 
continued expansion in the service sector in the 
fourth quarter.  
Graph 5: The short-term outlook for euro-area GDP 
growth (q-o-q changes in % –  1999Q1 2006Q1) 
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(1) Confidence level 68% (+/- one standard deviation of past 
forecast errors). 
Source: Commission services. 
Looking forward, Graph 5 displays the short-
term quarterly GDP growth projections for the 
euro area derived from DG ECFIN’s short-term 
dynamic factor model. This new model replaces 
the indicator-based model shown in the previous 
issues of this report. It is based on a more robust 
statistical methodology and statistical tests 
indicate that it exhibits significantly better 
forecasting properties than its predecessor (see 
Box 1 for an explanation of the methodology). 
The short-term dynamic factor model projects 
GDP quarter-on-quarter growth to range 
between 0.4% and 0.8% both in the fourth 
quarter of 2005 and in the first quarter of 2006. 
The growth profile is underpinned by buoyant 
international trade data and the sustained 
improvement in business survey results. These 
predictions are slightly more optimistic than the 
quarterly profile in the just-released ECFIN 
autumn forecast. 
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Box 1: A dynamic factor model for predicting quarterly euro-area GDP growth 
Until recently, the Commission services used an indicator-based model to make predictions of euro-area GDP 
growth for the two quarters following the latest quarterly GDP release. The indicator-based model was based on a 
regression equation linking euro-area GDP growth to six key indicators covering real and financial activity, such as 
car registrations, business confidence, the euro-area-US yield differential and the real effective exchange rate.  The 
relationship, which was based on historical data for the variables in question, was then used to make projections of 
growth for two subsequent quarters. A drawback of such indicator-based models is that they do not use all economic 
information, which might be relevant for producing good forecasts. In addition, the forecasting power of such 
models may diminish over time since they are based on historical relationships, which change as economic structures 
evolve. 
To overcome these limitations, the Commission services have decided to replace the indicator-based model by a 
dynamic factor model (see Grenouilleau (2004) for a technical description). The Commission’s dynamic factor model 
makes use of a broad range of economic data available at the time when the projection is made. It distils the relevant 
“factors” driving the euro-area business cycle from a dataset of around two thousand time series for the euro-area 
countries and uses these “factors” to make projections of euro-area GDP.  
Factor models provide a means of summarising the information contained in large datasets by a small number of 
“factors”. The approach assumes macroeconomic time series have two components: a common component 
corresponding to the business cycle and an idiosyncratic component that is specific to each time series.  It is the 
common component which is relevant for forecasting purposes. Various estimation procedures have been developed 
to extract the common factors from the underlying time series data.  The estimated common factors are then used to 
make projections of GDP. The time series used in the current model were selected on the basis of economic 
judgement and are assumed to contain information about the current and/or future economic situation in the euro 
area.  Reflecting the unavoidable uncertainty surrounding all such predictions, the projections are presented as ranges 
with confidence intervals rather than as point estimates.  
The performance of forecast models can be tested using out-of sample experiments, which compare past GDP 
growth data with the values that the model would have predicted at the time. The results are shown in the table 
below. Clearly, the root mean square error (RMSE) is lower for the dynamic factor model than that of the previously 
used indicator model.  This suggests that the dynamic factor model has superior forecasting accuracy. The model 
also performs at least as well as comparable models used by other institutions.  
 
 
Forecast RMSE (a) Dynamic factor model Eurocoin (b) 
ECFIN former GDP 
indicator 
OECD indicator 
equations (c) 
Coincident 0.19 to 0.21 0.22 to 0.25 0.19 to 0.35 0.21 to 0.30 
One Quarter ahead 0.21 to 0.24  > 0.35 0.31 to 0.39 
Two-quarter ahead 0.24 to 0.31    
Out-of-sample span (d) 25 quarters 1999Q3-2005Q3 
25 quarters 
1999Q3-2005Q3 
12uarters 
1998Q1-2000Q4 
20 quarters 
1998Q1-2002Q4 
Notes: 
(a) The RMSE differ according to the month in which quarterly forecasts are produced, hence the ranges. 
(b) Based on 3-month moving averages of the monthly indicator. 
(c) Combination of hard/survey indicators based on 0 to 2 months of current quarter information. 
(d) Different spans are a source of bias for a direct comparison. 
 
Reference: 
 
Grenouilleau, D. (2004), ‘A sorted leading indicators dynamic (SLID) factor model for short-run euro-area GDP 
forecasting’, European Economy. Economics Papers. No. 219. December. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers219_en.htm
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Risks to the outlook 
On the domestic side, risks to the short-term 
outlook appear balanced. 
Consumer confidence could improve by more 
than expected, due to better labour market 
conditions and a reduction of uncertainty 
concerning future income streams, thanks to 
past or ongoing structural reforms. Such a 
recovery in confidence could trigger a release of 
the accumulated pent-up demand, which could 
be financed through a reduction in the saving 
rate.  
In the case of investment, positive risks arise 
from stronger growth of specific housing 
markets, stronger-than-expected external 
demand or higher productivity as a result of IT 
investments and past reforms. However, the 
possibility of higher oil prices, entrenched low-
growth expectations and disappointing demand 
are negative risks. 
On the external side, risks appear to be tilted to 
the downside. 
The possibility of higher and more volatile oil 
prices cannot be ruled out. There could be an 
adjustment of consumer behaviour in the USA 
in the light of growing uncertainties about future 
income and the impact of rising interest rates. 
And a disorderly correction of global imbalances 
also remains a threat to world growth. On the 
positive side, the euro area should continue to be 
well placed to benefit from any extra demand 
from oil-exporting countries. 
Global economy is regaining momentum 
After going through a period of slower growth 
earlier in the year, the world economy seems to 
have regained some momentum. Notably, world 
trade has picked up recently, with the year-on-
year rate of increase rising from a low of 4.7% in 
April to an average growth rate of above 8% in 
August and September, the latest month for 
which data is available (Graph 6). Survey results 
reinforce the impression that the global 
economy is picking up steam. The fourth quarter 
reading of the World Economic Survey showed 
the first improvement of the world economic 
climate since the beginning of 2004, thanks to a 
significantly more positive assessment of the 
current situation. The recent improvement has 
been concentrated in western Europe and Asia. 
Oil prices peaked at almost 70 USD/bl in early 
September, as a series of hurricanes caused 
widespread damage to oil and refinery facilities 
in the US Gulf region. Since then, prices have 
come down, as the supply situation in the Gulf 
has gradually normalised and incoming stock 
data has calmed the markets. However, the 
barrel of Brent was still trading only slightly 
below 60 USD mid-December and prices are 
expected to remain at an elevated level for some 
years to come. 
Graph 6: World trade 
(% y-o-y changes in volume, Jan 2000 to Sep 2005) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis. 
The US economy has kept a good deal of 
forward momentum in the autumn of 2005 
despite the damage and disruption caused by 
recent hurricanes. Real GDP expanded at an 
annual rate of 4.3% in the third quarter, once 
more driven by vigorous growth in consumer 
spending. The fourth quarter is likely to register 
some softening in GDP growth due to the 
hurricane-induced disruptions to economic 
activity. However, recent high-frequency data do 
not indicate a fundamental weakening in the 
solid pace of expansion. Forward-looking 
indicators such as consumer confidence and 
capital goods orders recovered quickly after the 
hurricanes. The only sector which has shown 
some signs of cooling down is housing, but even 
here the evidence is still ambiguous. The annual 
GDP growth rate for 2005 is likely to be close to 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2005 
 
 
 
- 12 - 
3½%. Higher energy prices pushed headline 
inflation to 4.7% year-on-year in October, but 
core inflation has remained subdued at close to 
2%. The labour market resumed its path of 
moderate gains in payrolls in November, while 
the unemployment rate has remained stable at 
around 5%. The Federal Reserve has continued 
to withdraw monetary policy accommodation by 
raising the federal funds target rate to 4.25% in 
December. Longer-term interest rates have also 
increased by about half a percentage point over 
the autumn months.  
The Japanese economy seems on track for a 
sustained recovery, albeit at a moderate pace. In 
the third quarter of 2005, GDP grew by a 
seasonally-adjusted annual rate of 1.7%, down 
from 6.3% and 3.3% in the first two quarters of 
2005 respectively. Growth for the full year of 
2005 should reach 2.5%. Private consumption 
continues to increase, thanks to the marked 
improvement in the labour market situation, 
with total employment now on an upward trend 
and the unemployment rate standing at 4.5% in 
October. In the light of these developments, real 
wages have started to rise, albeit with some 
fluctuations. Thanks to high corporate 
profitability and significantly strengthened 
corporate balance sheets, non-residential 
investment is rising as well. On the external side, 
imports are continuing to accelerate in line with 
the upturn in domestic demand. Exports have 
started to pick up, mainly due to increased 
Chinese demand. In September, the current 
account surplus widened to JPY 1.86 trillion, or 
about €13.5 billion. 
Economic growth in China is continuing apace, 
averaging 9.4% at an annual rate in the first three 
quarters of this year. The ongoing strength of 
the Chinese economy has made it an engine of 
growth for the rest of the region. Following 
some deceleration in external demand in early 
2005, many countries in the rest of Asia are 
experiencing a strengthening in export growth in 
the second half of the year, notably with the IT 
sector gradually recovering, and with Chinese 
import demand strengthening. Growth slowed 
in Latin America in the first half of the year, as 
monetary tightening took its toll on domestic 
demand and slower global growth dampened 
external demand. With global growth picking up 
and monetary policy starting to ease in some 
countries, growth for the full year should 
nevertheless reach about 4% in 2005. The high 
price of oil should sustain growth in oil-
exporting countries, such as those in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and 
the Middle East, where growth is expected to 
reach about 7% and 5% respectively this year.  
Monetary and financial conditions  
Monetary conditions in the euro area, as 
measured by the Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI), have remained accommodative over 
recent months. Movements of the MCI were 
mainly influenced by a further depreciation of 
the euro exchange rate, while real short-term 
interest rates remained almost unchanged.  
Graph 7: Monetary condition index, euro area  
(inverted scale – Jan 1999 to Oct 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
On 1 December, the ECB increased its policy 
rates by 25 basis points.4 This was the first 
change of policy rates since June 2003 and the 
first interest rate hike since October 2000. By 
increasing interest rates, the ECB intends to 
withdraw some of the accommodation 
embedded in the monetary policy stance, though 
it will remain accommodative. This move 
intends to keep medium- to long-term inflation 
expectations in the euro area solidly anchored at 
levels consistent with price stability.  
                                                     
4  With the Monetary Conditions Index only running to 
October, the rise is not visible in Graph 7. At the time of 
completing this report, inflation data (which are 
necessary to calculate real interest rates) were only 
available to October. 
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The rate hike had been anticipated by financial 
markets. Expectations about a future rate hike 
had shifted significantly between October and 
November. While in early October, most market 
participants still expected an ECB rate hike only 
in the first half of 2006, a 25 basis points rate 
hike was completely priced in shortly before the 
ECB’s meeting on 1 December. Most market 
participants anticipate only a moderate increase 
of interest rates, pricing in another two 25 basis 
points hikes in 2006.  
Graph 8: ECB minimum bid rate and 3-months 
interbank rate (1 Jan 99 to 13 Dec 05) 
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Source: ECB. 
In the USA, the Fed continued its sequence of 
interest rates hikes and increased its policy rates 
by another two interest rate hikes of 25 basis 
points each on 1 November and 13 December 
respectively, bringing the target for the federal 
funds rate to 4.25%. At their November 
meeting, Federal Reserve policy makers decided 
that the economy had essentially shrugged off 
the impact of the hurricanes, leaving higher 
inflation as the biggest threat to the outlook. At 
the same time, some began for the first time to 
express worries that the Fed might go too far in 
its tightening cycle. The statement issued in 
connection with the rate hike on 13 December 
suggests that the Fed is approaching the end of 
the current tightening phase. However, financial 
markets expect a further rate increase for late 
January. One thing that did not affect market 
expectations was the announcement in October 
that Ben Bernanke would succeed Alan 
Greenspan as Federal Reserve chairman from 
1 February 2006; indeed his appointment was 
well received and seen as a continuation of 
current monetary policy. 
Graph 9: 3-months Euribor future implied rates (LIFE) 
(in %) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
There have been some downward pressures on 
European bond prices in the last two months. 
Led by the short end of the market, European 
bond yields rose from their historical lows as 
markets recognised the improvement visible in 
growth prospects and started to anticipate an 
interest rate hike by the ECB. 10-year-
government bond yields in the euro area have 
gained more than 20 basis points since the 
beginning of October, increasing from 3.19% to 
3.40% on 13 December. At the same time, US 
bond yields increased only slightly from 4.39% at 
the beginning of October to 4.52% on 
13 December, reducing the yield differential 
between US and euro-area government bonds 
from around 120 basis points to around 110 
basis points. 
Stock markets in the euro area first dropped in 
October in the wake of a shift in money market 
expectations but have rebounded since the 
beginning of November to reach their highest 
level since May 2002. Strong actual and expected 
corporate profit growth, a weaker euro and the 
decline in oil prices were the driving forces 
behind the recent gains.   
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Graph 10: Exchange rate developments, euro area  
(1 Jan 1999=100 – 1 Jan 1999 to 13 Dec 2005) 
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(1) Against 29 countries – double export weight. 
Source: EcoWin and Commission services. 
Following a short-lived appreciation after the 
summer, the euro exchange rate remained on a 
downward trend. The euro lost another 2.5% 
against the US dollar between the beginning of 
October and the beginning of December 
(bringing the dollar-euro exchange rate to its 
lowest level since November 2003) before 
strengthening slightly again. Since its record high 
of 1.36 USD/euro at the end of 2004, the euro 
has lost some 14% against the US dollar. In 
nominal effective terms, the euro has lost only 
6% against 29 other countries. The main theme 
in the dollar-euro segment of foreign exchange 
markets continues to be expected interest rate 
differentials (see Graph 11).  
Graph 11: Interest rate differential between the euro 
area and the USA (6 Mar 2000 to 13 Dec 2005) 
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(1) Three-month forward interest rate in the USA minus three-
month forward interest rate in the euro area. 
Source: EcoWin. 
2. A bond yield conundrum in the euro 
area? 
A remarkable feature of global macro-financial 
conditions in recent years has been a sustained 
decline in long-term interest rates to historically 
low levels. This trend has been particularly 
pronounced in the euro area, where the 
benchmark 10-year bond yield (German bund) 
dropped further from 4.4% in June 2004 to 3% 
in September 2005. In the same period, the 
corresponding US yield fell from 4.8% to slightly 
above 4%.  
Alan Greenspan’s famous ‘conundrum’ 
description at the beginning of the year has been 
echoed by many market participants.5 In the 
USA, the conundrum discussion seems relevant, 
as US yields have unexpectedly responded to the 
monetary policy tightening by the US Fed with a 
flattening yield curve, while in the past, 
tightening cycles have exerted upward pressure 
on long-term rates. The question remains 
whether the present level of long-term interest 
rates is also an unsolvable puzzle in the euro 
area.  
Historically low level of bond yields 
The judgment that bond yields are unusually low 
means that they are thought to be low relative to 
some objective criterion – historical norms, for 
example. Indeed, judging from a historical series 
based on long-run data for four ‘core’ euro-area 
countries (Belgium, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands), nominal 10-year ‘benchmark’ 
government bond yields in the euro area have 
reached lows that were recorded only in the 
heyday of the Gold Standard, before the First 
World War (see Graph 12).6  
                                                     
5  In his testimony on the occasion of the Federal Reserve 
Board's semi-annual Monetary Policy Report to Congress 
on 16 February 2005, Greenspan said ‘…it is difficult to 
attribute the long-term interest rate declines of the last 
nine months to glacially increasing globalization. For the 
moment, the broadly unanticipated behaviour of world 
bond markets remains a conundrum. Bond price 
movements may be a short-term aberration, but it will be 
some time before we are able to better judge the forces 
underlying recent experience.’ 
6  The choice of countries was partly determined by data 
limitations. However, for traditional high-yield countries 
such as Italy, data were not included even if they were 
available because the higher risk premia that prevailed 
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To some extent, this return of long-term interest 
rates to historical lows may reflect the return to 
some of the conditions that were prevalent for 
the last time before World War I: during the 
Gold Standard, ‘monetary policy’ was rules-
based, potential real GDP growth was relatively 
weak and inflation expectations can be assumed 
to have been low on average in the advanced 
economies.  
Graph 12: Nominal 10-year government bond yields: a 
historical perspective (in % – 1880 to 2005) 
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Source: Commission services, Deutsche Bundesbank, De 
Nederlandsche Bank. 
In the USA, the current level of long-term 
interest rates is low but, as in the case of the 
euro area, not exceptionally low in a very long 
historical perspective. Nominal government 
bond yields were at even lower levels than in 
continental Europe in most years between 1880 
and the early 1960s.  
Comparing current nominal bond yields to 
historical yields may be misleading, because the 
history of recent decades includes periods of 
exceptionally high inflation that raised bond 
yields but are unlikely to be repeated any time 
                                                                             
until convergence to the euro would have distorted the 
long-run comparison. Furthermore, it should be realised 
that during the classic Gold Standard, yields on British 
perpetuals were the best approximation to a risk-free 
rate, and before WWI these were even lower than the 
ones shown for the euro-area extrapolation. Long-run 
historical euro-area data have been constructed from data 
on Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands. 
Because data are missing for WWI for Belgium and WWI 
and WWII for Germany, the average of the other 
countries was taken as representative for those periods. 
soon. Accordingly, it could be more appropriate 
to also look at real or inflation-adjusted yields.7 
Yet another approach to assessing the current 
level of bond yields is to compare them not only 
with historical norms, but also with some neutral 
or equilibrium interest rate. An economic rule of 
thumb inspired by growth theory suggests that, 
in the long run, real risk-adjusted interest rates 
should track the growth in trend or potential 
GDP. Over the cycle, real long-term interest 
rates should therefore resemble real GDP 
growth plus a Fisherian risk premium reflecting, 
inter alia, potential risks of accelerating inflation. 
In other words, the difference between the 
inflation-adjusted bond rate and trend real 
growth can be seen as a measure of the risk 
premium related to unexpected changes in 
inflation over the maturity of the bond.  
Graph 13: Real 10-year government bond yields (1)  
(in % – 1961 to 2005) 
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(1) Deflated by CPI. 
Source: Commission services. 
While this rule of thumb might hold in the very 
long run, the relationship between potential 
growth and 10-year-government bond yields is 
less clear-cut at shorter time horizons. However, 
in 2005 real bond yields in the euro area did fall 
below potential GDP growth for the first time 
                                                     
7  When analyzing real interest rates, a distinction between 
ex-ante and ex-post measures should be made. Ex-post 
measures represent the effectively made return on an 
investment. Ex-ante measures reflect the expected return 
on an investment. (see e.g. ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 
2005). 
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since the early 1980s.8 For comparison, in the 
USA, real bond yields have been below potential 
GDP growth since 1999. This can be interpreted 
as being consistent with the inflation-related risk 
premium having been compressed to close to 
the low level that prevailed during the classic 
Gold Standard. This may reflect the impact on 
inflation expectations of successful anti-
inflationary policies led by strong and 
independent central banks in advanced 
economies.  
Graph 14: Difference between real 10-year government 
bond yields (1) and potential GDP growth 
(in % – 1966 to 2005) 
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(1) Deflated by CPI. 
Source: Commission services. 
While the long-term assessment of real bond 
yields has so far been based on ex post measures 
of inflation due to data limitations, an 
assessment of the period starting in 1999 can be 
based on ex-ante measures. As illustrated in 
Graph 15, longer-term growth expectations for 
the euro area have declined from around 2.5% 
to some 2% between 1999 and 2005. Real ex 
ante bond yields have fallen from more than 3% 
to levels close to 1%, bringing real bond yields 
below long growth expectations.  
To sum up, the long-run perspective suggests 
that, for the euro area at least, the recent 
development of bond yields reflects an 
environment which, in some key respects, more 
                                                     
8  The last episode in which real interest rates and real 
GDP growth rates were at comparable low levels was 
just before the World War I. Interpreting the data for the 
1970s and 1980s is complicated by the fact that the crude 
ex-post measure applied here does not take into account 
the unexpected inflation shocks in that period.  
closely resembles the period before the First 
World War than the conditions that prevailed 
for most of the twentieth century. The low long-
term real interest rate levels (particularly relative 
to real GDP growth) constitute a pronounced 
deviation from the past two decades in 
particular. But they are not so exceptional in a 
longer historical perspective. The current decline 
in bond yields could therefore mark a return to 
the earlier historical levels prevailing at times of 
low inflation, and the current level could become 
a permanent feature given the high credibility of 
monetary policy and its targets for price stability.  
Graph 15: Ex ante real 10-year government bond yields 
and expected GDP growth, euro area 
(in % – 1999Q1 to 2005Q3) 
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(1) Deflated by 5-years-ahead inflation expectations. 
(2) 5-years-ahead GDP growth forecasts.  
Source: Commission services, ECB Survey of Professional 
Forecasters. 
Global factors matter… 
Several global factors – often interrelated – have 
been put forward to explain the evolution in 
global long-term rates over the last year. Most of 
them refer to US rates but some can also be 
related to euro-area bonds. These factors include 
(i) increased central bank credibility in 
containing inflation; (ii) the mis-pricing of risks 
due to a coincidence of excess liquidity in the 
international financial system and investor search 
for yield; (iii) Asian central bank purchases of US 
Treasury bills to maintain their currency pegs; 
(iv) underinvestment in the corporate sector; 
(v) the prospect of population ageing due to 
which pension funds are being pressed to make 
significant additions to longer-term bond 
portfolios; and (vi) oil bill recycling. 
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Over the last decade, central banks all over the 
world have gained credibility as successful and 
determined inflation fighters. The outcome –
historically low nominal interest rates – reflects 
the advantages of a stable and credible monetary 
framework in which risk premia for unexpected 
inflation are very low and inflation expectations 
are contained. 
At the same time, the yields on inflation-indexed 
bonds also indicate that a declining price of 
inflation compensation cannot be the whole 
explanation for the low level of long-term yields. 
Also long-term ‘real’ rates of French indexed 
bonds fell noticeably by more than 100 basis 
points between mid-2004 and September 2005.  
Several other non-cyclical factors can be 
grouped together under the heading ‘ample 
supply of global liquidity’. Following the 
bursting of the stock market bubble at the 
beginning of the century, central banks in the 
major industrial countries massively loosened 
monetary policy. This subsequently led to a steep 
rise in global liquidity. The liquidity supply 
increased at a much faster rate than nominal 
output, resulting in a liquidity overhang leading 
to higher bond and real estate prices in many 
countries, as well as a rebound in equity markets 
from spring 2003 onwards. In the case of bonds, 
a search for yield has also resulted in historically 
low credit risk spreads for both corporate and 
emerging market bonds.  
Graph 16: Global excess liquidity as measured by the 
ratio of money supply to GDP (1)  
(1997=100, 1997 to 2004) 
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(1) M2 as a share of nominal GDP (USA, euro area, Japan and 
China). 
Source: Commission services, EcoWin. 
Contributing to this ample supply of global 
liquidity is the fact that many emerging market 
economies have adopted strategies to manage 
the flow of international capital since the 
financial crises in the 1990s. Since most of these 
crises were precipitated or exacerbated by the 
existence of large debts denominated in foreign 
currencies, monetary authorities in these 
countries have built up foreign exchange 
reserves by mobilising domestic savings and 
purchasing US Treasuries and other assets to 
immunise themselves against similar events in 
the future. 
The most often cited example is the yuan-dollar 
peg, which has helped to sustain China’s export-
led growth. Less visibly, many other Asian 
economies, including Japan, Korea, and the 
Tigers, have created soft pegs with the US dollar 
to preserve their competitiveness with China, 
also facilitated by the purchase of US financial 
assets. It should be noted that the ‘China-factor’ 
has also contributed to lower long-term interest 
rates as exports of low-cost products from China 
have exerted downward pressure on inflation in 
the euro area. 
Graph 17: Composition of foreign purchases  
of US T-Bills  (in % – Jan 98 to Aug 05) 
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Source: Commission services and US Treasury. 
Graph 17 shows the strong increase of Asian net 
purchases of US Treasury bonds and other 
federally sponsored agencies between 2002 and 
2004. Since the beginning of 2004, net purchases 
by Asian countries have declined, still leaving a 
large amount of holdings in the hands of Asian 
countries. While the short-term link between 
foreign purchases of US government paper and 
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the low yields on 10-year-government bonds 
seems convincing, research shows mixed 
results.9  
Since we know relatively little about international 
purchases of euro-area bonds, theoretically it 
would be conceivable that part of the build-up in 
Asian currency reserves was also made directly in 
euro or that the pressure on yields has spilled 
over into the European markets. For the United 
States, this effect will persist only as long as the 
dollar stays under depreciation pressure. But for 
the European markets it could prove a relatively 
permanent phenomenon if the euro establishes 
itself as a secure investment alternative to the US 
dollar.  
As the interest rate is the price which 
equilibrates supply and demand of capital, the 
low level of bond yields is also claimed to be 
associated with a weak demand for long-term 
capital. Corporate investment, particularly in the 
euro area and the USA, has been low and 
savings in the corporate sectors have increased. 
Corporate profitability has been high, but these 
profits seem to have been applied to buybacks, 
dividend increases and mergers & acquisitions 
activity rather than reinvestment. This situation, 
which could partly reflect a lack of promising 
investment opportunities, has been weighing on 
the overall demand of capital.  
Another driving factor behind the increased 
demand for long-term bonds is altered 
framework conditions for institutional investors. 
In particular, rising asset liability matching in 
retirement pension products is generating a 
strong demand for long-range investments with 
yield levels that are perceived as secure. Pension 
funds and insurance companies are being 
pressed to make significant additions to longer-
term bond portfolios. This demand for 
                                                     
9  While several studies find that 10-year Treasury yields 
could be up to 150 basis points higher if foreigners had 
not accumulated US bonds, other studies suggest that 
there is more to the conundrum of the recent low long-
term interest rates than the behaviour of official foreign 
purchases of US Treasury securities. (see for example 
Warnock, F. and V. Warnock (2005), International 
capital flows and US interest rates’, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance 
Discussion Papers, No. 840; and Wu, T. (2005), ‘The 
long-term interest rate conundrum: not unraveled yet?’, 
in: FRBSF Economic Letter, No. 2005-08, April 29, 
2005). 
increasingly longer-term obligations is evident in 
the favourable reception given to the fifty-year-
maturity bonds recently issued by France and the 
United Kingdom. 
A final factor driving the current bond yield level 
is the increase in oil prices, which has affected 
bond yields in two ways.  
First, rising oil prices have pushed up current 
account balances in oil-exporting countries in 
the Middle East, Russia, Nigeria and Venezuela, 
which may have caused an increased demand for 
fixed securities. However, Graph 17 shows that 
the net purchases of US Treasury bonds by 
Venezuela and Russia have been rather stable at 
a very low level. However, limited data 
availability gives rise to speculations about how 
oil exporters might be re-investing their profits. 
Several options are possible: offshore dollar 
bank accounts; buying US debt through 
intermediaries, so that a Treasury bond bought 
by a private investor in the UK is actually owned 
by an investor in the Gulf; or buying euro debt, 
driving euro yields down, widening the 
differential between US and European long-term 
rates and thus inducing private European 
investors to shift into dollars. 
Second, higher oil prices have affected market 
expectations differently than in the past. In the 
past, higher oil prices (which were largely supply-
driven) led to increased inflation expectations 
and hence to higher nominal and real bond 
yields. Now, financial market participants seem 
to price in lower growth rather than higher 
inflation, eventually leading to lower nominal 
and real yields. 
…but euro-area-specific macro factors 
should not be ignored. 
Although these global factors seem to have 
contributed to the recent decline in bond yields, 
euro-area-specific macroeconomic factors 
should not be overlooked.  
Both potential and expected growth have 
deteriorated in the euro area in recent years. 
While the potential growth of the euro area is 
estimated to have dropped from slightly above 
2.5 % in 1999 to slightly below 2% in 2005, 
short-term growth expectations have declined 
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more significantly in the same period. The one-
year-ahead forecast for GDP growth in the euro 
area as published by the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters has slipped from 3.4% in Q3 2000 
to 1.7% in Q4 2005. This continuous worsening 
of the outlook has contributed to a sharp decline 
in expected short-term interest rates. Graph 19 
shows a strong correlation between the expected 
3-months-money-market rate one year ahead 
and real long-term bond yields. This seems to 
indicate that the future stance of monetary 
policy matters for the determination of long-
term interest rates.10 
Graph 18: Real bond yields, growth expectations and 
oil prices, (in % – 1999Q1 to 2005Q3) 
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(1) Deflated by 5-year-ahead expected inflation. 
(2) 1-year-ahead. 
(3) USD per barrel, y-o-y change. 
Source: Commission services, ECB Survey of Professional 
Forecasters, EcoWin. 
To sum up, the low level of bond yields appears 
to be less of a conundrum in the euro area than 
in the USA, given monetary policy 
(expectations), lower (potential) economic 
growth expectations and changes in pension 
funds regulations.11 The recent pick-up in 
European bond yields since the beginning of 
October seems to support this finding as it 
                                                     
10  However, there is a potential reverse causation from 
long-term real rates to the stance of monetary policy. For 
example, if long-term real interest rates are high because 
the economy is expected to grow rapidly over the next 
years, inflationary fears may force the central bank to 
raise short-term interest rates. 
11  For instance, in the Netherlands a new supervisory 
framework will come into effect in 2006, requiring Dutch 
pension funds and life insurers to value assets and 
liabilities on a marked-to-market basis.  
appears to have mainly been driven by market 
expectations about future ECB hikes and lower 
oil prices. However, over the last fifteen years, 
bond market developments have been 
increasingly influenced by global trends – most 
of all by US bond developments. The spread 
between US and German bond yields has 
fluctuated between +150 and -150 basis points 
and was at 105 basis points in November. Euro-
area bond yields could therefore increase in 
response to US yield increases irrespective of 
euro-area-specific macroeconomic factors. 
Graph 19: Real 10-year government bond yields and 
monetary policy expectations (in % – Jan 99 to Nov 05) 
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(1) Deflated by 1-year-ahead inflation forecast. 
(2) 3-months future 4 quarters ahead.  
Source: Commission services, ECB Survey of Professional 
Forecasters, EcoWin. 
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Focus 
II. Ageing populations in the euro area: what impact on 
employment and growth? 
This focus presents an assessment of the economic impact of an ageing population for the euro area from 2004 to 2050, 
pointing to pressing economic policy challenges for the euro area. The shrinking of the working-age population will result in 
total employment growth slowing down in the period 2012-2016 and henceforth becoming negative despite rising participation 
in the labour market. Therefore, euro-area policy makers should exploit the narrow window of opportunity opened until 
2012, when labour supply is not much affected by ageing. Once the window is closed, the growth rates in economic activity and 
in living standards will fall steadily to levels well below those observed in recent decades. Moreover, the sources of economic 
growth will alter over time, with productivity becoming the only driver of growth. Fiscal challenges will come from the rising 
imbalance between an increasing proportion of older people and a declining share of those economically active.  
As regards policy conclusions, the focus underlines that achieving the Lisbon employment targets will not be sufficient to offset 
the effects of demographic change, which stresses the critical role of labour-market reforms and of polices aiming at raising 
productivity. Ageing is an evolving process and a key challenge is to improve the labour-market functioning and adapt 
welfare-state policies to make them sustainable in the face of uncertain economic and demographic developments. In particular, 
expected financing problems in public pension schemes stem to a large extent from the failure of contribution/entitlement 
parameters in public pension schemes such as the retirement age to adjust in the face of increased life expectancy. 
1. A quick overview of key demographic 
trends and prospects12 
The euro-area population will undergo dramatic 
changes in coming decades due to low fertility 
rates, continuous gains in life expectancy and 
large inward migration. Since the launch of the 
euro, considerable attention has been paid to the 
budgetary implications of ageing populations and 
their effect on the sustainability of public 
finances. In their most recent assessment, the 
Commission and Council concluded that there 
are significant risks to the sustainability of public 
finances in most of the euro-area Member 
States.13 
This focus section addresses the equally 
important issue of the impact of ageing on the 
real economy, and in particular on employment 
and growth. It presents new projections of the 
                                                     
12  The focus section draws upon the macroeconomic 
assumptions developed by the Ageing Working Group 
attached to the EPC and the Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs.   
13  This assessment is made in the context of the annual 
analysis of national Stability and Convergence 
programmes. A summary of the Commission and 
Council’s most recent assessment can be found in 
European Commission (2005), ‘Public finances in EMU – 
2005’, European Economy, No 3, 2005, pp 50-64. 
impact of ageing on the labour market and 
potential economic growth up to 2050 for the 
euro area as a whole and its Member States.14  
According to the latest Eurostat projection, the 
population in the euro area will be older in 2050, 
as a result of three factors. 15 
¾ Low fertility rates remaining persistently below the 
natural replacement rate: from 1.5 for the euro 
area in 2004, Eurostat projects only a limited
                                                     
14  These projections have been made as part of a joint effort 
undertaken with the Ageing Working Group attached to 
the Economic Policy Committee to produce age-related 
expenditure projections on pensions, health care, long-
term care, education, and unemployment transfers. The 
projections will be finalised in early 2006, and are made 
on the basis of a ‘no-policy change’ assumption, i.e. they 
reflect currently enacted pension and health care polices. 
Full details on the underlying assumptions and projection 
methodologies can be found in EPC and European 
Commission (2005), ‘The 2005 EPC age-related 
expenditure projections: agreed underlying assumptions 
and projection methodologies’, 
European Economy Special Reports, No 4, http://europa.eu.in
t/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_econ
omy/2005/eespecialreport0405_en.htm 
15  The population projections presented in this focus were 
prepared by Eurostat for the Ageing Working Group 
attached to the EPC.  
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recovery to 1.6 by 2050.16 
¾ Continuous increases in life expectancy: life 
expectancy at birth for males in the euro area 
is projected to rise by almost 6 years to 82.1 
in 2050, and by more than 4.5 years for 
females to 87.2. Much of the projected gains 
in life expectancy will occur at higher ages, 
and life expectancy at 65 is projected to 
increase by about 3.5 years by 2050. 
¾ Net inward migration into the euro area 
currently amounts to 1.2 million people, i.e. 
0.4% of the population. It is projected to fall 
to 700 000 persons by 2010 (0.2% of the 
population) and to remain at that level 
thereafter.  
The total population of the euro area will remain 
almost unchanged at some 308 million up to 
2050.17 However, there are wide differences 
across countries, reflecting quite uneven 
projected developments in fertility, life 
expectancy and migration. Significant increases in 
several euro-area members (BE +4%, NL +8%, 
FR +9%, IE +36% and LU +42%) contrast with 
projected declines in four countries (GR -3%, PT 
-4%, DE –6% and IT -7%), while population is 
                                                     
16  The most important indicator of fertility (i.e. total period 
fertility rate) is the average number of children of a 
hypothetical or ‘synthetic’ generation of women. 
17  It should be borne in mind that euro-area population will 
increase until 2025 and then revert back to its 2003 level. 
projected to remain broadly constant in 3 
countries (FI, ES and AT). 
Of more significance are the dramatic changes 
projected as regards the age structure of the 
population. As illustrated in Graph 20, the euro-
area population in 2004 contains a bulge in 
persons of working age. By 2050, an inverted 
cone shape is evident, reflecting the passage of 
baby boomers into retirement years, increasing 
life expectancy and the effects of prolonged low 
fertility rates.  
The share of young persons aged 0-14 in the 
total population is projected to decline, with their 
overall numbers dropping by 18% until 2050. 
From an economic perspective, the most relevant 
change concerns the working-age population (15-
64). This will start to fall as of 2010 in the euro 
area (sooner in some countries), and drop by 37 
million, or 18%, by 2050. Again, Member State 
divergences are wide, with declines of more than 
20 pp projected in 5 countries (DE, GR, ES, IT, 
PT). In contrast, the elderly population aged 65+ 
will rise sharply, by 41 million (or 78%), by 2050. 
The fastest growing segment of the population 
will be the very old (80+) whose number will rise 
by almost 24 million, an increase of 189%.  
As shown in Graph 21, over the next decades, 
the old-age dependency ratio, that is, the number 
of people aged 65 years and above relative to 
those between 15 and 64, is projected to double 
and reach 53% in 2050. This means that the euro 
Graph 20: Age pyramids for the euro-area population, 2004 and 2050 (in 000s) 
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area will go from the current situation of four 
people of working age for every elderly citizen to 
a ratio of 2 to 1. A modified concept is the 
‘effective economic old-age dependency ratio’, 
which is the number of non-active persons aged 
65 and above as a percentage of employed 
persons aged 15 to 64. This ratio is higher than 
the old-age dependency ratio, and projected to 
rise sharply for the euro area from 40% in 2004 
to 57% in 2025 and 74% in 2050. 
Graph 21: Dependency ratios (in %) 
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(3) Total population less employed as % of employed pop. 15-64. 
Source: Commission services. 
2. The impact of ageing on the labour 
market  
A new labour-force projection shows the 
Lisbon employment targets will be reached, 
albeit behind schedule  
Based on this population projection, a new 
labour force projection has been produced for 
the period up to 2050 (see Graph 22).18 The 
overall employment rate in the euro area is 
projected to rise from 63% in 2004 to 67% in 
2010 and the Lisbon employment rate of 70% 
                                                     
18 The detailed analysis can be found in Carone, G. (2005), 
‘Long-term labour force projections for the 25 EU 
Member States. A set of data for assessing the economic 
impact of ageing’, Economic Papers, Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, forthcoming. The 
labour-force projection was made by extrapolating 
forward employment rates by gender and age (young, 
prime age, older worker) on the basis of recently 
observed trends.  
would be reached in 2035 only. However, it is 
worth stressing that the employment rates of 
many euro-area countries would lag behind the 
euro-area average.  
Graph 22: Projected employment rates and Lisbon 
targets in the euro area (in %) (1) 
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(1) Employment rates are defined as the number of persons 
employed divided by the size of the working age population (15-64); 
data for 2000 and 2004 are historical; data for 2010-2050 are 
projections. 
Source: Commission services. 
The projected increase of the employment rate in 
the euro area is mainly due to rising employment 
rates for females and older workers. 
The female employment rates is projected to rise from 
just over 54% in 2004 to 62% in 2015 and – 
more slowly – to 64% by 2034, remaining 
broadly stable thereafter. This would imply that 
the 60% Lisbon employment rate target for 
females will be reached just one year after the 
targeted year of 2010 due the gradual 
replacement of older women with low 
participation rates by younger women who have 
a much stronger attachment to the labour 
market.  
The employment rate of older workers in the euro area 
is projected to increase sharply from almost 39% 
in 2004 to 47% by 2010 and 59% in 2025. This is 
well in excess of the 50% Lisbon employment 
target which is projected to be reached by 2013. 
The projection reflects the observed trend 
increase in the employment rate of older workers 
in recent years (up by 4.3 pp since 2000). A 
significant part of the projected increase in the 
employment rate is due to the positive effects of 
recent pension reforms, which have curtailed 
access to early-retirement schemes, raised 
statutory retirement ages (including minimum 
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ages from when pension income can be drawn), 
and increased the financial incentives in pension 
systems to delay retirement. 
Following a brief window of opportunity 
employment will decrease significantly  
Meeting the Lisbon employment target, albeit 
with a considerable delay, will temporarily 
cushion the effects of ageing on the labour force. 
In the end, however, demographic forces will 
outweigh the improved labour market 
performance and the overall numbers of persons 
employed will start to decline. For the euro area 
as a whole, three distinct time periods can be 
observed (as shown in Graph 23). 
Graph 23: Projected working-age population and total 
employment, euro area (in millions – 2003 to 2050 ) 
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Source: Commission services. 
2004-2011 – a window of opportunity when both 
demographic and employment trends are favourable: both 
the working-age population and the number of 
persons employed are set to increase during this 
period. Although the rate of increase is slowing 
down, this period can be viewed as a window of 
opportunity for structural reform since both 
demographics and labour force trends are 
supportive of growth. 
2012-2016 – rising employment rates offset the decline in 
the working-age population: during this period, the 
working-age population will start to decline as 
the baby boom generations enter retirement. 
However, the continued projected increase in the 
employment rates of women and older workers 
will cushion the demographic factors and the 
overall number of persons employed will 
continue to increase, albeit at a slower pace. 
From 2012 onwards, the tightening labour 
market conditions (lower labour-force growth 
together with unemployment down to NAIRU) 
may increase the risk of labour market mismatch. 
It should also be noted that this window of still 
growing employment is projected to be slightly 
narrower than that of the EU25, where 
employment is expected to decline as of 2018. 
The ageing effect dominates from 2017: the trend 
increase in female employment rates will broadly 
have worked itself through by 2016, and the 
employment rate of older workers is projected to 
reach a steady state in the absence of further 
pension reform. Consequently, there is no 
counter-balancing factor to ageing, and thus both 
the size of the working-age population and the 
number of persons employed are on a downward 
trajectory. Having increased by some 12 million 
between 2004 and 2016, employment during this 
last phase is projected to contract by over 20 
million, i.e. a fall of some 8 million over the 
entire projection period.  
Employment prospects differ across 
countries 
The broad trends described above are common 
to many countries, but they are not uniform.  
Graph 24: Projected employment growth, euro-area 
Member States (% change over 2003-50) 
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Source: Commission services. 
As shown in Graph 24, the two smallest Member 
States (IE, LU) are projected to experience a 
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pronounced rise in employment between 2003 
and 2050,19 while the change in employment in 
three euro-area Member States (FR, NL, BE) is 
projected to be slightly positive. Four Member 
States are projected to see falls in employment 
that are well above the average for the euro area 
of -5% over the entire projection period (DE, 
GR, IT, PT). 
3. The impact of ageing on potential 
growth 
Potential growth rates will fall over time in 
almost all euro-area countries... 
By combining the employment and productivity 
forecasts, a projection has been made for 
potential GDP growth rates up to 2050. Labour 
productivity is assumed to converge to a growth 
rate that is broadly in line with the trend 
observed in the US and the euro area over the 
                                                     
19  This is due mostly to favourable demographic 
developments. In addition, the employment rate is also 
projected to rise strongly in Luxembourg.  
past three decades.20 For euro-area countries, 
labour productivity growth is projected, on 
average, to be 1.6% for the period up to 2050.  
Graph 25: Potential growth, its sources and per capita 
GDP growth  
(average annual % growth in three sub-periods) 
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
2004-10 2011-30 2031-50
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
Labour productivity growth Employment growth
Potential Growth GDP per capita growth
 
Source: Commission services.  
                                                     
20  The complete analysis, the detailed assumptions used, as 
well as various sensitivity tests, can be found in Carone, 
G., Denis, C., McMorrow, K.,  Mourre, G. and W. Röger 
(2005), ‘Long-term labour productivity and GDP 
projections for the EU25 Member States: a production 
function approach’, Economic Papers, Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, forthcoming. 
Table 3:  Projected potential growth rates in the euro area and their determinants 
(employment/productivity) over 2004-2050 (% annual average) 
 Due to growth in 
 
Real GDP 
growth in 
2004-2050 
Productivity 
of which 
TFP Capital deepening 
Labour 
input 
of which 
Population Employment rate 
Share of 
working age 
population 
 1=3+6 3=4+5 4 5 6=7+8+9 7 8 9 
BE 1.7 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.3
DE 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.2
EL 1.5 1.8 1.0 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.4
ES 1.6 1.7 1.0 0.7 -0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.5
FR 1.8 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.3
IE 2.9 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.3 -0.3
IT 1.3 1.6 1.0 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.5
LU 3.1 1.8 1.1 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.7 -0.2
NL 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.6 -0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.2
AT 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.4
PT 1.5 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.5
FI 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3
Euro area 1.5 1.6 1.1 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.4
EU 15 1.6 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3
EU 25 1.7 1.8 1.2 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3
Source: Commission services. 
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As illustrated in Graph 25, potential growth is 
projected to decline as a result of ageing 
populations. The annual average potential GDP 
growth rate is projected to decline from 2.1% in 
the period 2004-10 to 1.7% in the period 2011-
30, and to 1.2% between 2031 and 2050. The 
average potential growth rate is projected to be 
1.5% over the whole projection period from 
2004 to 2050 (see Table 3). 
In Table 4 the projections are broken down into 
three subperiods. Almost all countries are 
projected to experience a steady decline in 
potential growth, although there are large 
differences in the projections across countries. 
These differences mainly reflect divergent 
employment growth over the whole projection 
period along with different recent trends in 
productivity growth, which are partly carried 
over to the start of the projection. In many 
countries (DE, GR, ES, IT, AT, PT), potential 
annual growth rates will drop to close to, or 
below, 1% during the period 2030 to 2050. Only 
a few small countries (LU and IE) are projected 
to enjoy an average growth rate higher than 
2.5%. Over the whole period, most countries are 
expected to grow at a rate ranging from 1.5% to 
1.8%.  
As shown in Graph 25, living standards as 
measured by GDP per capita should also decline 
after 2012. It is, however, projected to hold up 
slightly better at the end of the projection than 
what is suggested by the trend in the headline 
GDP growth rate. Indeed, the growth in GDP 
per capita depends on the change in the age 
structure of total population (i.e. share of 
working-age population over total population), 
while potential growth hinges not only on the 
latter but also on the change in the total 
population size, which is projected to decline 
from 2025.  
… and the sources of growth will change 
with productivity becoming dominant 
In addition to falling potential GDP growth 
rates, the sources of growth will alter 
dramatically. Employment will make a positive 
contribution to growth in the euro area up to 
2010, become broadly neutral in the period 2011-
2030 and turn significantly negative thereafter.  
In practice, increasing employment rates (which 
on average will contribute 0.3 pp to average 
GDP growth over the projection period up to 
2050) partly offset the decline in the share of the 
working-age population (which will be a negative 
Table 4: Projected potential growth rates in the euro area (%-annual average) 
Potential growth Productivity Employment 
 
2004-10 2011-30 2031-50 2004-10 2011-30 2031-50 2004-10 2011-30 2031-50 
BE 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.7 0.9 -0.1 -0.2
DE 1.7 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.6 1.7 0.8 -0.3 -0.5
EL 2.9 1.6 0.8 2.1 1.8 1.7 0.9 -0.2 -0.9
ES 3.0 2.0 0.6 1.1 1.9 1.7 1.9 0.1 -1.1
FR 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7 0.8 0.1 -0.1
IE 5.5 3.3 1.6 3.4 2.5 1.7 2.1 0.8 -0.1
IT 1.9 1.5 0.9 0.7 1.7 1.7 1.1 -0.2 -0.8
LU 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.2 1.0 1.3
NL 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.7 1.7 0.6 -0.1 0.0
AT 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.7 0.7 -0.2 -0.5
PT 1.9 2.1 0.8 1.2 2.4 1.7 0.7 -0.3 -0.9
FI 2.7 1.7 1.5 2.1 2.0 1.7 0.6 -0.3 -0.2
Euro area 2.1 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.7 1.0 -0.1 -0.5
EU 15 2.2 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.7 0.9 -0.1 -0.4
EU 25 2.4 1.9 1.2 1.5 2.0 1.7 0.9 -0.1 -0.5
Source: Commission services. 
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drag on growth by an average of -0.4 pp). Over 
time, productivity will become the dominant and, 
in some countries, the only source of growth. 
4. Policy implications  
Significant, but not insurmountable, policy 
challenges lie ahead21 
The projections point to pressing economic 
policy challenges for the euro area. From an 
economic perspective, potential growth rates and 
increases in living standards would fall to rates 
below those observed in recent decades.  
Pressure for increased public spending will result 
from the higher share of the total population in 
older age cohorts that require larger public 
transfers (e.g. pensions) and services (health care, 
long-term care). The sheer size of this pressure 
will raise complex issues on the role of public 
transfers in achieving an appropriate distribution 
of resources between a smaller active population 
and a larger inactive retired population.  
Some positive developments are underway, 
in part due to reforms already carried out 
A number of positive indications nonetheless 
emerge from the analysis. 
Firstly, employment rates and levels are projected 
to continue rising for at least a decade, which will 
offset somewhat the decline in the size of the 
working-age populations and provide a window 
of opportunity to undertake necessary reform 
measures.  
Secondly, projections confirm the validity of the 
approach adopted by the EU in the Lisbon 
strategy. They already incorporate the 
achievement of the overall Lisbon employment 
targets (although only by 2035), but also confirm 
the importance of policies to raise productivity. 
Higher levels of investment in physical and 
human capital, together with efforts to 
strengthen innovation and R&D activities, could 
                                                     
21  The conclusions in this section draw heavily on Carone, 
G., Costello, D., Diez-Guardia, N., Przywara, B., Mourre, 
G. and A. Salomaki (2005), ‘The economic impact of 
ageing populations’, Economic Papers, Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, forthcoming. 
yield substantial productivity gains over the long 
run, especially against the background of a 
knowledge-based society.  
Thirdly, the analysis shows that policy reforms 
work and that they can have a material impact on 
the capacity of economies to cope with the 
economic impact of ageing. Whilst the major part 
of the projected increase in total employment is 
due to the autonomous effect of higher female 
employment rates linked to societal change, 
structural reforms will play a non-negligible role, 
especially in the case of older workers. The 
projections indicate that reforms already enacted 
by Member States could significantly contribute 
to the increase in the employment rate of older 
workers.22 This projected increase in employment 
is welcome and will make a positive contribution 
to economic growth.  
Does the euro area need to look beyond the 
Lisbon employment targets in the face of 
ageing?  
Even if the euro area as a whole achieves the 
Lisbon employment targets (albeit considerably 
later than the original target date of 2010), this 
will not be sufficient to offset the economic 
effects of demographic change. It is worth 
recalling that the employment rates of several 
individual countries will remain below the 70% 
Lisbon target in 2050 and that there will be 
substantial unused labour capacity. For example, 
many countries would continue to have 
substantial gender employment gaps. The better 
integration of migrants, measures to tackle the 
grey economy and the abuse of disability 
schemes, together with efforts to address social 
exclusion that leads to lasting inactivity could all 
further raise labour supply.  
Moreover, the projected very strong increase in 
the euro area employment rate of older workers 
to around 59% by 2025 needs to be viewed in 
context, as it is still lower than that observed 
today in countries such as the USA. Moreover, it 
implies that a significant number of persons 
would continue to withdraw early from the 
labour force despite increasing life expectancy 
and improving health at older ages. Given these 
considerations, it is important to look beyond the 
                                                     
22  See Carone (2005) and Carone et al. (2005). 
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Lisbon targets, which, after all, are an aggregate 
goal of the EU as a whole. 
Does Europe face an ageing challenge or a 
retirement challenge? 
Ageing is a dynamic process, and the policy 
challenge is to develop labour-market and 
welfare-state policies which are adaptable and 
sustainable in the face of uncertain economic and 
demographic developments.  
The dynamic challenge is illustrated in Graph 26, 
which shows the percentage of adult life 
(age15+) which is spent in retirement in 2003 
and the projected level in 2050. In the euro area, 
the average exit age from the labour market is 
61.7 for males and 61.3 for females. By 2050, this 
is projected to have risen to 62.7 and 61.8 
respectively. This implies an increase in the share 
of adult life spent in retirement, from 30% to 
32% for males, and from 34% to 37% for 
females. In order to keep the share of adult life 
spent in retirement constant at its 2003 level, the 
average exit age would need to rise by an 
additional 2 years for both males and females, i.e. 
an increase which is considerably larger than 
projected. A priori, there is no economic rationale 
for favouring a constant share of adult life spent 
in retirement, and indeed a preference for a 
longer period of leisure time in retirement could 
be justified on the basis of rising living standards. 
However, retirement decisions need to be 
economically and financially viable. 
Graph 26: The share of adult life spent in retirement – 
euro area (in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Achieving the necessary extension in working 
lives will prove challenging, as adjustments will 
have to be made in people’s expectations and 
behaviour. It not only requires ensuring that 
tax/benefit and wage systems provide financial 
incentives to remain economically active and to 
invest in human capital, it is also necessary to 
enhance job opportunities for older persons who 
posses appropriate skill sets. Policies to tackle age 
discrimination and to promote life-long learning, 
flexible retirement pathways and healthy work 
conditions warrant careful consideration. Flexible 
retirement ages adapting to higher life expectancy 
could be an efficient policy response to this 
challenge.  
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Focus 
III. The impact of higher oil prices on inflation 23 
Substantial and lasting increases in oil prices over the last two years have led to concerns about rising inflation. The energy 
component of the HICP currently contributes close to one percentage point to headline inflation in the euro area. In addition 
to these direct effects, indirect price pressures are beginning to be felt as producers pass on higher input costs into their final 
prices. In general, the total contribution of rising oil prices to headline inflation via indirect effects is estimated to be only 
slightly smaller than the contribution via direct effects. However, indirect effects tend to materialise with a significant time lag 
and feed through into consumer price inflation over a longer period than direct effects. Due to these lags, indirect effects could 
exert significant upward pressures on core inflation in 2006 even if oil prices remain at their current levels. Second-round 
effects have so far remained muted. Wage demands have not reacted noticeably to rising energy costs, as labour market 
conditions remain weak in most Member States and inflation expectations have remained contained.  
                                                     
23  The impact of higher oil prices on growth was analysed in a previous issue. See QREA Vol. 3, N° 2 (2004) “How vulnerable is 
the euro-area economy to higher oil prices?” 
1. Recent developments in oil prices 
The past two years have seen a steady and 
substantial rise in oil prices. Based on monthly 
averages, the price of Brent increased from 
around 30 USD/bl in February 2004 to over 
64 USD/bl in August 2005. Prices eased between 
September and November but have increased 
again since end-November and were at 
59 USD/bl in mid-December. They are expected 
to remain high for the years ahead.  
Graph 27: Developments in oil prices  
(Jan 1970 to Nov 2005) 
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Source: IMF and Commission services. 
There are certain key differences between the 
recent oil price increase and previous shocks in 
which oil prices remained at a high level for 
several years (1974, 1979 and 1999-2000). While 
the percentage increase of oil prices in euro has 
been smaller for the 2004-05 period than for 
previous oil price shocks in both nominal and 
real terms, the level changes have been 
comparatively larger (Table 5).  
Table 5: Brent crude oil price developments: 
comparison of various price hikes 
 
Dec 73 
Dec 74 
Nov 78 
Dec 79 
Jun 99 
Sep 00 
Feb 04 
Aug 05 
 Change in % 
Nominal 
(USD) 154.3 171.8 109.1 107.6 
Nominal 
(EUR) 143.4 152.9 148.8 113.6 
Real 
(EUR)(1) 128.1 139.4 146.0 109.8 
 Change in level (initial level within brackets) 
Nominal 
(USD) 
7.1 
(4.6) 
25.6 
(14.9) 
17.0 
(15.6) 
33.2 
(30.9) 
Nominal 
(EUR) 
5.4 
(3.8) 
16.4 
(10.0) 
22.4 
(15.0) 
27.7 
(24.4) 
(1) Oil prices are deflated with the EU12 CPI data before 1991 and 
the euro-area HICP data thereafter. 
Source: IMF and Commission services. 
 
More importantly, the factors driving the price 
increase in 2004-05 differ from earlier oil price 
shocks. While the three previous oil price shocks 
were mainly caused by sizeable disruptions to oil 
supply, a variety of factors have had an impact 
on the oil price increase in 2004-05. A major 
factor was a more buoyant than expected 
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demand for oil. According to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), growth in world demand 
for oil accelerated from 2.3% in 2003 and 3.7% 
in 2004. China and the USA were the key drivers 
behind the surge in oil demand in 2004. China 
alone accounted for about 30 percent of the 
increase in world demand for oil that year, while 
Asia and America together accounted for nearly 
70% of the rise. Despite high oil prices, demand 
for oil is estimated to have expanded by about 
2% in 2005.  
Another important factor that has contributed to 
the recent price rise is the increase in 
uncertainties regarding the security of oil 
supplies. Numerous acts of sabotage in Iraq, 
threats to the oil infrastructure of other Middle 
Eastern producers and civil unrest in Nigeria 
have caused concern with regard to the 
possibility of supply disruptions and put upward 
pressure on oil prices. Over the summer, 
concerns over possible supply disruptions due to 
hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico also played a 
temporary role. 
Graph 28: Oil and gas prices (1)  
(three-month averages Jan 1985 to Nov 2005) 
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(1)  Gas prices = Russian border price. 
Source: Ecowin. 
Finally, supply bottlenecks for light and sweet 
grades of oil also help to explain the oil price 
increase in 2004-05. Very high demand for 
finished oil products of light and sweet grades of 
oil, such as petrol, diesel and heating oil, coupled 
with environmental regulations have put a great 
strain on the existing capacity for processing 
heavy and sulphur-rich grades of oil. This factor 
appears to have been particularly important in 
2004, when the quality-related premiums that had 
to be paid for light and sweet grades of oil, such 
as Brent, over heavy and sour grades of crude oil, 
such as Dubai, rose temporarily to over 
15 USD/barrel. While in 2005 the spreads have 
narrowed, they remain around three times as 
high as their historical average.  
Changes in oil prices also spill over into other 
energy markets. Especially gas markets follow oil 
market developments closely. Graph 28 shows 
that gas prices have increased between 
September 2004 and September 2005 by 70%. 
Gas prices tend to follow oil price developments 
with a lag of 6 months or more.  
2. The impact of oil prices on inflation: 
reviewing the channels 
Increases in oil prices can affect inflation in 
different ways. These include a direct effect, 
indirect effects via the demand- and supply-side 
channels on the product market, and second-
round effects via the wage bargaining process 
and inflation expectations (Graph 29).  
Graph 29: A flow chart of oil prices’ effects on the 
economy 
Source: Commission services. 
The present section reviews the relative 
importance of these three transmission channels, 
while the next section provides an assessment of 
the overall size of the inflationary effect of the 
recent oil price increase based on model 
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simulations. It should be noted that an oil price 
change may impact on the real economy via 
several other transmission channels, such as 
confidence effects, changes in the terms of trade 
and stock market developments. These channels 
on the real economy have been analysed in an 
earlier issue of the QREA.24 
The direct effects 
The direct effect refers to the impact of an oil 
price change on the overall HICP of the euro 
area through its immediate effect on the 
consumer prices of energy. The energy 
component in HICP accounts for about 8.6% of 
the total HICP consumption basket (in 2005). Its 
average contribution to HICP inflation during 
the period 1991–2003 was 0.2 pp. Based on 
annual averages, Brent prices in EUR/bl 
increased by 21% in 2004 while energy inflation 
picked up to 4.5% that year, contributing about 
0.4 pp to headline HICP in the euro area 
(Graph 30). During the first ten months of 2005, 
crude oil prices in euro increased further by 
45%,25 while energy inflation averaged 10%, 
adding almost 0.9 pp to headline HICP. 
Graph 30: Energy inflation, euro area  
(y-o-y in % – Jul 2003 to Oct 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The energy sector of the HICP is broadly defined 
and includes next to oil and oil-products also 
other categories like electricity, gas, solid fuels 
and heat energy, which differ in the degree to 
                                                     
24  QREA Vol. 3, N° 2 (2004) “How vulnerable is the euro-
area economy to higher oil prices?”  
25  Average over first 10 months of 2005 compared with 
annual average for 2004. 
which they are linked to developments in oil 
markets. The direct impact of the oil price 
increase to energy prices is obviously strongest 
for the subcomponents ‘liquid fuels’ and ‘fuels 
and lubricants for personal transport equipment’, 
which, together, contributed 0.3 pp to headline 
HICP in 2004. In the first ten months of 2005, 
the contribution from these energy components 
doubled to 0.6 pp (Graph 31). 
Graph 31: Contribution of energy components to HICP 
inflation, euro area (y-o-y in % – Jul 2003 to Oct 2005) 
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Source: IMF and Commission services. 
Table 6 shows very high correlations between oil 
prices and the two oil-related subcomponents, 
‘liquid fuels’ and ‘fuels and lubricants for 
personal transport equipment’. The correlation 
for the overall energy component of the HICP is 
slightly lower, reflecting the strong but less direct 
link to non-oil-related subcomponents.  
Table 6: Correlations between oil prices and 
HICP energy components (in %) (1) 
HICP component 
(weight in 2005) 
Correlation  
(Jan 1995- Oct 2005)
Energy (8.6%) 94.9 
Fuels and lubricants for personal 
transport equipment (3.9%) 96.7 
Liquid fuels (0.8%) 98.0 
(1) Brent in EUR/bl. 
Source: IMF and Commission services. 
 
Econometric analysis shows that the pass-though 
of an increase in Brent prices into energy price 
inflation is quite rapid (Box 2). About three 
quarters of the impact of an oil price increase is 
already felt in consumer energy prices after 1 
month. Some additional (though moderate) 
inflation pressures are felt 6 to 12 months 
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Box 2: Quantifying the direct effects of oil prices on consumer price inflation  
 
Changes in oil prices directly impact on consumer price inflation via their effect on the energy component of the 
HICP. To gain a better understanding of the size and the speed of this direct transmission channel, several equations 
relating HICP energy inflation to oil prices were tested. In Equation 1 below, annual energy inflation (calculated as 
the year-on-year percentage change in the energy component of the HICP) is regressed on various lags of the annual 
change in oil prices in euro. The equation is estimated with monthly data for the 1995-2005 period and includes a 
correction for autocorrelation in the residuals. As the HICP energy component also covers non-oil energy products 
(e.g. coal), Equations 2 and 3 display similar regressions estimated for the subcomponent covering only gas and oil-
related categories (‘liquid fuels’ and ‘fuels and lubricants for personal transport equipment’), respectively. The graph 
below shows the lag structure of the equations. 
 
Pass-through speed of an oil price increase  Best fit equations (1) 
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(1)  Energy HICP (annual % change) 
      Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-Stat.
      Constant 1.460 0.184 7.9
      Oil Price 0.397 0.023 17.5
      Oil Price (lagged 1 month) 0.236 0.023 10.2
      Oil Price (lagged 6 months) 0.119 0.021 5.6
      Oil Price (lagged 12 months) 0.109 0.026 4.1
      AR(1)= 0.64 (t = 6.6); Adjusted R² = 0.976; Sample monthly 1995 M2 to 2005 M10
 
(2)  Liquid fuels HICP (annual % change)   
      Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-Stat.
      Constant 1.472 0.413 3.5
      Oil Price 0.670 0.044 15.3
      Oil Price (lagged 1 month) 0.491 0.044 11.1
      Oil Price (lagged 6 months) 0.111 0.042 2.6
      AR(1)= 0.63 (8.6); Adjusted R² = 0.971;Sample monthly 1996 M2 to 2005 M10 
 
(3)  Gas HICP (annual % change)  
      Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-Stat.
      Constant 2.897 1.641 1.7
      Oil Price (moving avg. lagged 2-12 months) 1.105 0.165 6.7
      AR(1)= 0.93 (17.7); Adjusted R² = 0.974;Sample monthly 1996 M2 to 2005 M10 
 
Source: Commission services. (1) Oil price = year-on-year change of monthly average spot of 
Brent in euros.  
Source: IMF and Commission services. 
 
Analysis of the estimated equations suggests the following conclusions: 
¾ Changes in oil prices start to feed through into energy inflation almost instantaneously and most of the 
transmission is achieved very rapidly. After one month, three quarters of an oil price shock is already reflected 
in HICP energy inflation.  
 
¾ However, changes in oil prices also impact on energy prices with longer lags of about 6-12 months. These 
lagged effects, which remain relatively small, are likely to reflect some stickiness in the adjustment of energy 
prices as well as a delayed response of natural gas prices to crude oil prices. Supporting the latter interpretation 
is the fact that Brent prices lagged by 12 months are not a significant explanatory variable in the case of the 
estimation performed with the oil-related subcomponent of the HICP energy category (Equation 2) which does 
not cover natural gas. There is also some indication that the gas component of the HICP reacts to changes in 
oil prices with substantial lags of about 3-12 months (Equation 3). 
 
¾ Regarding the size of the pass-through, the estimated equation suggests that a 10 euro increase in oil prices lifts 
energy inflation by 8.6 pp after a year, adding 0.7 pp to headline inflation. Given the lag structure of the 
estimated equation, the inflationary impact of an oil shock will remain visible over a period of two years but will 
lessen substantially after 13 months. 
 
¾ Econometric results are broadly the same for the oil-related subcomponent of the HICP energy category, 
except that the inflationary impact of a rise in oil prices is about 50% higher than for the broader energy sector 
and the pass-through is somewhat faster. 
 
¾ As to the short-term outlook, the equation suggests that energy inflation will begin to decelerate from early 
next year onwards if Brent prices remain at their current levels in euro and will have diminished considerably by 
the summer. 
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later, reflecting the lag with which oil prices 
affect natural gas prices and some stickiness in 
energy prices. Overall, a 10 euro increase in 
Brent prices leads to a pick-up in energy inflation 
of 8.6 pp after a year. Econometric results are 
broadly the same when analysing the more 
narrow category of liquid fuels and lubricants, 
except that the inflationary impact of a rise in oil 
prices is about twice as high as in the case of the 
broader energy sector and the pass-through is 
slightly faster. Looking forward, the estimated 
equations suggest that, if Brent prices in euros 
remain at their current level, energy inflation will 
begin to decelerate from early next year onwards. 
By next summer, the contribution of energy to 
headline inflation should be back to low levels.  
While the recent oil price increase has had a large 
direct impact on inflation in the euro area as a 
whole, this impact differs across Member States. 
Table 7 suggests that energy price inflation in 
Luxembourg, Greece, Belgium and Ireland was 
most affected by the recent oil price increase, 
while energy inflation in Italy, Finland and 
Germany was least affected. The increase in the 
energy component of the HICP directly dented 
households’ purchasing power by 1.6 pp in 
Luxembourg but by only 0.4 pp in Italy. Factors 
explaining the differentiated impact between 
Member States include differences in oil intensity 
across Member States as well as differences in 
the tax levels on the prices of oil products.26 
Local product market conditions, such as 
oligopolistic behaviour and the lack of 
competition in distribution, may also have 
contributed to the heterogeneity of the direct 
impact of the recent oil price increase. 
The direct inflationary impact from the recent oil 
price increase in the euro area can also be 
compared with the impact in non-European 
economies. As shown in Table 8, oil-related 
inflation and its contribution to headline inflation 
were almost twice as high in the USA as in the 
euro area.  
Country differences are explained partly by 
varying levels of excise duties on oil products. 
Differences in oil intensity, measured as oil 
supply divided by GDP in Table 8, also explain 
differences in the impact. The varying impact on 
prices at the consumer level can also be 
attributed to the fact that different grades of 
crude oil (with different prices) are used and 
refined (with different refinery costs) in the 
economies considered. Also, the length of oil 
supply contracts varies among economies and 
affects the impact of price changes.  
                                                     
26 Fuel tourism also increases the HICP weight of fuels in 
Luxembourg.  
Table 7: Direct impact of the April 2004- October 2005 oil price increase on HICP, euro area 
 
Energy 
inflation (%) 
(1) 
Energy items 
weight (%) (2) 
Average 
contribution 
to MS’ HICP 
(pp) 
Average 
contribution 
to euro-area 
HICP (pp) 
Level of taxes 
in gasoline 
prices (%) (3) 
Oil intensity 
(toe/million 
USD) (4) 
Belgium 11.7 10.2 1.16 0.039 66.0 105.3
Germany 7.9 9.9 0.78 0.227 71.5 67.1
Greece 11.8 6.9 0.80 0.022 51.7 134.2
Spain 8.8 8.7 0.78 0.088 59.4 113.9
France 8.8 8.7 0.73 0.151 71.9 67.0
Ireland 11.6 7.9 0.89 0.012 63.8 76.7
Italy 6.2 6.4 0.39 0.075 66.3 79.4
Luxembourg 15.5 11.6 1.59 0.004 59.6 130.6
Netherlands 9.2 8.6 0.79 0.041 69.2 84.1
Austria 9.9 8.2 0.76 0.024 61.5 71.6
Portugal 8.6 8.5 0.71 0.015 66.5 142.4
Finland 6.3 7.4 0.45 0.007 69.6 85.0
Euro area 8.4 8.6 0.70 0.704 67.8 80.7
(1) Average y-o-y change in energy components of the Member States’ HICP. 
(2) Average energy components weight in Member States’ HICP in 2005. 
(3) The data concerns VAT + excise duties on premium unleaded (95 octane) gasoline in 2004. 
(4) Primary supply of oil expressed in millions of tonnes equivalent divided by GDP at constant prices in billions of USD in 2003. 
Source: IEA and Commission services. 
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Table 8: The direct impact of the 2004 oil price 
increase on CPI/HICP: an international 
comparison  
 Euro area (1) 
Japan 
(2) 
US 
(3) 
Oil-related CPI/HICP 
inflation (y-o-y change) 7.4 4.2 17.9 
Weight in CPI/HICP (%) 4.3 3.0 3.5 
Contribution to headline 
CPI/HICP (pp) 0.32 0.13 0.62 
Level of taxes in gasoline 
prices (%) (4) 67.8 52.7 18.2 
Oil intensity (toe/m USD) 80.7 52.7 89.2 
(1) Oil-related HICP subcategories: ‘liquid fuels’ and ‘lubricants and 
fuels for transport equipment’. 
(2) Oil-related CPI subcategory: petroleum products. 
(3) Oil-related CPI subcategories: fuel oil and other fuels in 
housing, and motor oils (lubricants and gasoline) in transportation. 
(4) Premium unleaded (95 octane) gasoline for the euro area and the 
USA. Regular unleaded gasoline for Japan.  
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics, IEA, Statistics Bureau of Japan 
and Commission services. 
The indirect effects 
Indirect effects refer to the impact that an oil 
price shock, by increasing energy input costs, 
may have on prices of other goods and services. 
The size of the indirect effect depends on the oil 
intensity of the economy and on the extent to 
which firms use profit margins to absorb rising 
costs, i.e. on the degree of competitiveness in 
product markets.  
Table 9: Correlations between Brent prices and 
various HICP and PPI components (%) (1) 
HICP components 
(weight in 2005) 
Correlation  
(Jan 1995- Oct 2005) 
Passenger transport by road (0.5%) 80.3 
Passenger transport by air (0.5%) 77.8 
Combined passenger transp. (0.5%) 80.8 
PPI Correlation  (Jan 1990- Sept 2005) 
Manufacturing 76.1 
Energy 90.7 
Intermediate goods 78.0 
(1) Brent in EUR/bl. 
Source: IMF and Commission services. 
 
The indirect effects can be illustrated by the 
correlations between oil prices and the oil-related 
passenger transport components of HICP or 
producer price indexes. As seen in Table 9, the 
correlations are relatively strong.  
Graph 32: Contributions from HICP transport 
components and changes in Brent oil prices, euro area  
(y-o-y in % – Jul 2003 to Oct 2005) 
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(1) Level of Brent oil prices in euro. 
Source: IMF and Commission services. 
Indirect effects tend to feed through into the 
economy with much longer time lags than direct 
effects. In addition, there is evidence that these 
lags vary considerably depending on the sectors 
considered. For instance, the first effects of a 
change in oil prices are felt relatively rapidly in 
the transport components of the HICP, i.e. 
passenger transport by road and by air, and 
combined passenger transport (see Graph 32).27 
In contrast, the indirect effect of an oil-price 
change on producer prices seems to take more 
time to materialise (approximately 4-12 months - 
Graph 33). It takes still longer to reach 
consumers. 
Measuring the size of the indirect effects is 
difficult, as it is hard to isolate the effect of oil 
price changes from other cost factors such as 
labour costs, capital costs and input material 
costs. Box 3 looks further into the issue using 
input-output and econometric analysis. Results 
suggest that indirect effects on inflation can be 
quite significant and are probably only slightly 
smaller than direct effects. They tend to 
materialise with a substantial time lag, i.e. after 
more than a year, and feed through into 
consumer price inflation over a longer period 
than direct effects. Hence, they tend to prolong 
the direct impact of oil prices on inflation rather 
than to amplify it.  
                                                     
27  However, if the first indirect effects are felt relatively 
rapidly in the case of transport sectors, Box 2 shows that 
the complete pass-through of higher oil prices can be 
quite slow even in these sectors.  
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Box 3: Quantifying indirect effects of oil prices on consumer price inflation  
 
Input/output analysis 
In the euro area more than half of fuel is not used for final consumption but as input for the production of goods 
and services. An increase in the price of fuel can therefore lead to significant indirect price effects. These occur either 
because individual sectors use fuels directly in the production process or because fuel is needed in the production of 
intermediate inputs. Input-output analysis provides a useful tool to quantify the indirect price impacts that are due to 
fuel as a direct and intermediate production input.  
 
Sectoral cost exposure to higher oil prices (1) 
(Oil as direct and intermediate production input  
% of output value) 
Econometric estimates of indirect effects in the 
euro area (1) 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Computer and related activities
Post and telecommunications
Textiles
Motor vehicles
Food products and beverages
Pulp and paper products
Rubber and plastic products
Agriculture
Basic metals
Chemicals and chemical products
Land transport
Air transport
Direct
Intermediate
(1) Core HICP (excluding energy)  (annual % change)   
      Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-Stat.
      Constant 0.11 0.07 1.71
      Core HICP(lagged 1 quarter) 0.86 0.05 17.71
      Unit labour costs (3-year moving average) 0.09 0.03 3.07
      Output gap (lagged 1 quarter) 0.10 0.02 4.29
      Real effective exchange rate (lagged 7-9 quarters) -0.99 0.27 -3.66
      Oil price change (lagged 3- 7 quarters) 0.01 0.00 2.98
      Dummy for outlier in 1994Q1 -0.40 0.13 -3.04
      Adjusted R² = 0.985; Sample quarterly 1991Q2 2005Q3 
 
(2) Air transport prices (annual % change)   
      Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-Stat.
      Constant 0.41 0.15 2.64
      Air transport prices (lagged 1 month) 0.80 0.06 12.59
      Oil price change (lagged 2-12- months) 0.04 0.02 2.02
      Oil price change (lagged 13-24- months) 0.07 0.02 2.73
      AR(1)= -0.43 (-4.9); Adjusted R² = 0.53;       Sample monthly 1996 M03 - 2005 M09  
 
(1) Based on input-output table for 2000 of BE, DE, FR, IT, NL, 
AT and FI. 
Source: Commission services. 
(1) Oil price = year-on-year change of monthly average spot of Brent 
in euros.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
The graph in this box shows indicative examples of the differentiated cost impact oil prices have on various sectors. 
Not surprisingly, the most significant cost exposure can be found in transport sectors and chemical and heavy 
industries. Most services are relatively unaffected. Since fuels are a significant direct input for the provision of 
transport services (over 11% in air transport and over 6% in land transport), higher oil prices raise production costs 
in these sectors immediately. The transport sectors also are subject to cost increases due to induced price increases in 
their intermediate inputs. Compared to the direct costs of higher fuel prices, these would be relatively small. 
However, cost pressures from more expensive intermediate products can be substantial in some sectors, for instance 
in rubber and plastic production, which uses inputs from the chemicals sector. Similarly, paper and food products 
have relatively sizable intermediate energy inputs.  
To analyse the detailed impact of an energy price increase, input-output analysis can of course only provide an 
indicative ranking. First, the table reflects the values for the year 2000, when fuel prices were a third lower than now. 
Second, the analysis only captures mechanical increases in costs, but ignores the possibility of substituting inputs to 
cushion the impact of a differentiated pass-through. Finally, the analysis is exclusively based on an increase in oil 
prices, ignoring a parallel increase in the price of other fuels, notably gas. The impact of such an increase could be of 
the same order of magnitude as that of oil alone.  
The impact of crude oil prices on core inflation 
Indirect effects can be measured by estimating econometrically the determinants of core inflation. The first equation 
in the table above shows that much of the fluctuations in core inflation in the euro area can be explained by changes 
in unit labour costs (ULCs), the output gap, changes in the real effective exchange rate, and in oil prices. Most of the 
impact of ULCs is felt only slowly (as indicated by the size of the coefficient on the three-year moving average of 
ULCs). The output gap also has a positive impact on prices. Significant inflationary pressures of changes in the 
exchange rate and oil prices only materialise with long lags. Assuming constant unit labour costs, a 10 euro rise in 
Brent prices will start to be felt after a year and will lift the annual rate of core inflation by about 0.2-0.3 pp over the 
following three years. Comparing the results of this equation with the direct effect measured in Box 2 broadly 
confirms the findings of the input-output analysis regarding the relative sizes of the direct and indirect effect. The 
magnitudes of the two effects are broadly comparable, although the econometric estimate suggests that indirect 
effects may be slightly smaller than direct effects and are spread over a longer period of time. The equation explains 
recent developments in core inflation fairly well, suggesting that high oil prices have recently begun to push up core 
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inflation. These oil-related inflationary pressures have, however, been modest and offset by modest developments in 
unit labour costs and the lagged impact of the past euro appreciation. The effect of high oil prices on inflation could 
be more substantial in 2006 and could be felt until the second half of 2007. 
A priori, indirect effects could be expected to take hold fastest in sectors that use fuels as a direct input while sectors 
that depend on energy as an intermediate input should react more slowly. However, econometric analysis shows that, 
even in a heavily fuel-dependent sector like air transport, the price response can be surprisingly sluggish with the 
bulk of the impact being felt only after two years (Equation 2). This demonstrates that the ability to pass through 
cost increases is often overshadowed by sector-specific constraints, such as the competitive situation or the lead time 
it takes to change prices. 
Based on an estimated equation of core inflation, 
the increase in oil prices observed since 2004 has 
begun to exert some upward pressures on the 
price of non-energy related goods and services 
but these indirect effects have so far remained 
modest and have been offset by moderate 
growth in unit labour costs and the lagged effects 
of the past euro appreciation. However, the 
equation suggests that indirect effects could exert 
significant upward pressures on core inflation 
through 2006 even if oil prices remain at their 
current level.  
Graph 33: Brent oil prices and producer prices, euro 
area (y-o-y in % – Jul 2003 to Oct 2005) 
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(1) Level of Brent oil prices in euro. 
Source: IMF and Commission services. 
Second-round effects 
Second-round effects refer to the possibility that, 
in addition to direct and indirect effects, an oil 
shock may have an impact on inflation if it 
influences wage bargaining and price-setting 
behaviour. Second-round effects from an oil 
price increase will materialise if workers manage 
to obtain compensation for the associated 
decline in real income or if a rise in inflation 
expectations leads to higher outcomes in the 
wage bargaining process, which are then passed 
on to consumers. 
For the euro area as a whole, there are currently 
no signs of a pick-up in wage inflation. Graph 34 
shows recent changes in negotiated wages and 
the growth in the actual total wage rate as 
measured in national accounts. Recent 
developments in wages have remained quite 
benign, with, in particular, actual wage inflation 
showing a mild downward trend since the 
beginning of the year. This suggests that the 
current economic context, in particular weak 
labour market conditions, is exerting downward 
pressure on wage claims.  
Graph 34: Negotiated wage and wage rate, euro area  
(y-o-y changes in % –  2000Q1 to 2005Q2) 
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(1) ECB’s indicator of negotiated wages. 
(2) Wage bill divided by total salaried employment, NIA.  
Source: ECB and Commission services. 
Wage data are only available up to the second 
quarter of the year. For a more up-to-date 
assessment of possible second-round effects, it is 
therefore important to analyse more recent data 
on inflation expectations. The European 
Commission and the ECB provide survey data 
on short-term price or inflation expectations in 
the euro area. Both surveys indicate that, 
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although the rise in oil prices since the beginning 
of 2004 has not left inflation expectations 
unaffected, its impact has remained limited.  
Graph 35: Expected prices in Commission surveys and 
Brent oil prices (Jan 1999 to Nov 2005) 
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(1) Price trends over next 12 months – net balance in %. 
(2) Selling price expectations for months ahead–net balance in %. 
(3) Y-o-y changes in Brent oil prices in euro. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 36: Expected inflation in the ECB survey and 
Brent oil prices (1999Q1 to 2005Q2) 
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(1) Average forecast in the ECB’s Survey of Professional 
Forecasters, euro-area HICP inflation rate one year ahead. 
(2) Y-o-y changes in Brent oil prices in euro. 
Source: ECB and Commission services. 
The European Commission surveys show that the 
short-term price expectations of both consumers 
and manufacturers are generally affected by large 
fluctuations in oil prices. However, the rise in 
expectations since the beginning of the euro has 
remained fairly contained and more modest than 
during the previous oil shock of 1999-2000 
(Graph 35). This is particularly true in the 
manufacturing sector, where the past 
appreciation of the euro and increased 
international competition seem to have 
dampened price expectations. 
Data on inflation expectations from the ECB 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) also seem to 
be influenced by oil price developments 
(Graph 36). Nevertheless, the acceleration of oil 
prices in 2004-05 has not pushed short-term 
inflation expectations above the ECB medium-
term objective of an inflation rate of close to, but 
below, 2%. Expectations have remained 
contained in a narrow band since the beginning 
of 2004. Similarly, long-term inflationary 
expectations based on French index-linked 
bonds have also changed little and remained 
close to 2%.  
Graph 37: Wage inflation in some euro-area Member 
States (1) (y-o-y % change)  
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(1) Wage data cover the entire economy for DE, ES, FR, IT, AT 
and FI (excl. agriculture in the case of FR) but only industry for BE 
and IE, and manufacturing for PT.  
Source: EcoWin and Commission services. 
Overall, data on wages and inflation expectations 
suggest that second-round effects are presently 
absent in the euro area as a whole. Is there any 
empirical evidence so far of second-round effects 
in the individual euro-area Member States? 
Graph 37 shows the development of wage 
inflation in some of the euro-area Member States 
in 2004 and the first two (three) quarters of 2005. 
In 2005, total-economy wage inflation has so far 
fallen in Spain, Italy and Finland, while it has 
been almost unchanged in Austria. There has 
been a very mild pick-up in wage inflation for the 
total economy in Germany and France, but in 
Germany the level of wage inflation remains 
extremely low. For some of the other Member 
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States total-industry wage data can be looked into 
in the absence of data for the economy as a 
whole. In 2005, industry wage inflation has so far 
either decelerated sharply compared to 2004 
(Ireland) or remained negative (Belgium and 
Portugal).  
Graph 38: Changes in households’ price expectations 
during the last two oil price shocks, euro-area Member 
States (1) (2)(net balance – change in pp)  
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(1) Changes in the three-month moving averages.  
(2) Data are not available for LU before January 2002. 
Source: Commission services. 
Turning to developments in inflation 
expectations at the Member State level, Graph 38 
displays a comparison of changes in households’ 
assessment of price trends in the next 12 months 
(household survey of the European Commission) 
between 1999-2000 and 2004-05 oil price shocks. 
For the two shocks, the change in price 
expectations is calculated for a period during 
which the rise in Brent prices was similar (about 
20 euros) although starting from different initial 
levels. For a majority of Member States, the rise 
in inflation expectations among households has 
been lower in the current oil price shock than 
during its predecessor. However, a somewhat 
stronger increase in price expectations at the 
current juncture has been registered in the 
Netherlands and Spain and, to a lesser degree, in 
Greece. These three countries have also reported 
far larger increases in price expectations since the 
beginning of 2004 than the rest of the euro area. 
In Graph 39, a similar comparison between the 
oil-price shocks is performed, but for 
manufacturers’ selling price expectations for the 
months ahead (manufacturing survey of the 
European Commission). The rise in the inflation 
expectations of euro-area manufacturing 
companies has been much smaller during the 
current oil price shock than during its 
predecessor. In several Member States 
manufacturing companies’ inflation expectations 
have even fallen since the beginning of 2004. 
Factors, such as globalisation and increased 
competition among manufacturing companies, 
could explain this disconnection between 
manufacturers’ and households’ price 
expectations.   
Graph 39: Changes in manufacturing companies’ price 
expectations during the last two oil shocks, euro-area 
Member States (1) (net balance – change in pp)  
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(1) Changes in three-month moving averages.  
Source: Commission services. 
Overall, both wage and price expectation data 
paint a benign picture of wage developments in 
most euro-area Member States. Risks of 
significant second-round wage effects appear, at 
the moment, to be limited. However, these risks 
might be somewhat higher in those few Member 
States where the labour market appears relatively 
tight and where workers’ price expectations have 
increased noticeably in recent months (Greece 
and Spain). In addition, wage bargaining systems 
may respond more strongly to rising oil prices in 
some Member States due to wage indexation 
practices. Wage indexation is present in a formal 
or a more informal way in many Member States. 
There is automatic wage indexation in Belgium 
and Luxembourg. In addition, wage indexation 
clauses are common in collective wage 
agreements in Spain, Finland, Greece and the 
Netherlands. In these countries, indexation 
generally takes the form of additional wage 
increases when inflation exceeds certain 
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thresholds. In Italy, negotiated wages can be 
adjusted ex-post in case of inflation surprises. 
Finally, indexation of minimum wages is present 
in several Member States. Formal or informal 
indexation of statutory minimum wages exists in 
Belgium, France, Greece and Luxembourg, while 
there is formal indexation of collectively agreed 
minimum wages in Italy.  In Spain and Germany, 
inflation is one of the criteria used to adjust 
statutory or collectively agreed minimum wages. 
3. The impact of oil prices on inflation: 
overall assessment 
Any assessment of the overall impact of changes 
in oil prices is complicated by the fact that there 
can be strong interactions between the three 
channels discussed in the previous section and 
developments in the real economy. In particular, 
a rise in oil prices may fuel wage inflation if 
workers try to recoup losses in purchasing 
power. However, it will also dampen domestic 
demand as the associated terms of trade loss 
must inevitably be assumed by domestic 
households or corporations. The resulting 
weakening of activity will tend to exert 
downward pressure on wages.  
Due to the existence of such interactions, an 
overall quantitative assessment of the inflationary 
impact of an increase in oil prices can only be 
made via model simulations. Table 10 displays 
the results of simulations carried out with various 
macroeconometric models, including 
DG ECFIN’s QUEST model.28 It provides 
estimates of the inflation and growth impact of a 
50% permanent increase in oil prices. This 
corresponds broadly to the increase in the euro 
price of a barrel of Brent observed since the 
beginning of 2005.  
The simulations carried out with DG ECFIN’s 
QUEST model suggest that a permanent 50% oil 
price increase adds about 0.5 pp to consumer 
price inflation during the two years following the 
shock.29 The inflationary effect fades after three 
years. Wage moderation prevails and second-
round effects are small as the shock also has a 
significant negative effect on GDP growth that 
depresses wages. Other simulations shown in the 
table provide a similar broad picture, although 
the smaller inflation effect in the NiGEM model 
and the larger one in the Interlink model suggest 
that the range of uncertainty associated with the 
simulation exercise is significant. Any 
comparison between simulations carried out with 
different models should in any case be 
considered with extreme care, as differences in 
                                                     
28  For other overviews of recent model simulation results, 
see ECB (2004), ‘Oil prices and the euro-area economy’, 
Annual Report 2004, April; and Schneider, M. (2004), 
‘The impact of oil price changes on growth and inflation’, 
Monetary Policy & the Economy, Q2/04, 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna. 
29  When interpreting the results of simulations, it should be 
borne in mind that, in most models (including QUEST), 
inflation is measured by the consumption deflator rather 
than the HICP. The consumption deflator covers a 
significantly broader range of goods and services than the 
HICP. As a result, the weight of oil products in total 
inflation is substantially smaller for consumption deflator 
inflation than for HICP inflation.  
Table 10: The impact of a 50% permanent increase in oil prices on euro-area inflation and real GDP growth 
– Simulation results from some macroeconomic models. 
Inflation Real GDP growth 
Study - Model name 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
European Commission (2005) – QUEST 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 
Ades et al (2004) - Goldman Sachs Oil Gage 
Model 0.7 0.3 -- -0.7 -0.8 -- 
Barrell and Pomerantz (2004) – NIESR – 
NiGEM 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.1 
Dieppe and Henry (2004) – ECB AWM 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
IEA (2004) – Interlink model 0.6 0.7 -- -0.6 -0.6 -- 
Note: -- indicates that no results are reported. The original results in the studies by Ades et al, Barrell and Pomerantz, and IEA are based on 10, 
20, and 40% oil price rises, respectively. Assuming linearity, these results have been adjusted to a 50% oil price increase.  
Source: Commission services –Ades, A, Fuentes, M, Sharenow, G and M. Vaknin (2005), “Is there Life after $60/bbl?”, Global Viewpoint, Issue 
No: 05/05, 23 March, Goldman Sachs – Barrell, R and O. Pomerantz (2004), “Oil prices and the world economy”, NIESR Discussion Paper, No. 
242 –  Dieppe, A and J. Henry (2004), “The euro area viewed as a single economy: How does it respond to shocks?”, Economic Modelling, 21, 
pp. 833-875 – IEA (2004), “Analysis of the Impact of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy”, IEA Energy Papers, May. 
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estimated impact may reflect differences in 
modelling assumptions and strategies.  
Overall, three main conclusions can be drawn 
from the analysis presented in this focus.  
First, the rise in oil prices registered over the past 
two years has already had a significant effect on 
the energy component of the HICP. If oil prices 
are maintained at the current level, this direct 
effect should fade progressively during the 
course of 2006.  
Second, changes in oil prices have begun to exert 
some indirect effects on core inflation as 
producers have started to pass through higher 
input costs into their final prices. These indirect 
effects, which are usually slow to materialise, 
have so far remained modest but could result in 
significant upward pressures on inflation in the 
euro area in the year ahead.  
Finally, inflationary pressures from oil prices 
have been partly offset so far by other factors 
like modest unit labour  costs developments and 
the lagged impact of the past euro appreciation. 
Second-round wage effects have so far remained 
muted. Both wage and inflation expectations data 
show that the euro-area economy is not 
responding more strongly to the current oil price 
shock than to its predecessor of 1999-2000. If 
anything, a weaker cyclical position and a looser 
labour market should allow an even softer 
response of wages to soaring oil prices than in 
1999-2000. There is a risk that second-round 
effects may be less benign in some Member 
States where the response of wages to higher oil 
prices may be amplified by a relatively tight 
labour market or the existence of wage-
indexation schemes. Available data on inflation 
expectations suggest, however, that this risk is 
currently low. 
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IV. Recent DG ECFIN publications  
1. Policy documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 3. 2005 
Public finances in EMU –2005 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/publicfinance_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 5. 2005 
Economic Forecasts, Autumn 2005 - 2007: growth picks up 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 6. 2005 
The EU Economy 2005 Review 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/the_eu_economy_review_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.18. April 2005 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Economic Review of ENP Countries 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers18_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.19. November 2005 
The 2005 EPC projection of age-related expenditure: Agreed underlying assumptions and projection 
methodologies 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers19_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.20. November 2005 
Consumption, investment and saving in the EU: an assessment 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers20_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. SPECIAL REPORT. No. 1. 2005 
The contribution of wage developments to labour market performance   
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2005/eespecialreport0105_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. SPECIAL REPORT. No. 3. 2005 
Labour market and wage developments in 2004, with special focus on risk of jobless growth 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2005/eespecialreport0305_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. SPECIAL REPORT. No. 4. 2005 
The 2005 EPC projections  of age-related expenditure (2004-2050) for the EU-25 Member States: underlying 
assumptions and projection methodologies  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2005/eespecialreport0405_en.htm 
2. Analytical documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 228.  
Michael R. Bryan (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland) and Stefan Palmqvist (Sveriges Riksbank)  
Testing near-rationality using detailed survey data 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers228_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 229.  
Salvador Barrios (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and Eric Strobl (Ecole Polytechnique, 
Paris) 
The dynamics of regional inequalities 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers229_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 230.  
Heikki Oksanen (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs)  
Actuarial neutrality across generations applied to public pensions under population ageing: effects on 
government finances and national saving 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers230_en.htm  
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EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 231.  
David R Collie (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University) 
State aid to investment and R&D 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers231_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 232.  
Gilles Mourre (Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Wage compression and employment in Europe: First evidence from the structure of earnings survey 2002 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers232_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 233.  
Carlos Martinez-Mongay (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and Khalid Sekkat (University of 
Brussels) 
Progressive taxation, macroeconomic stabilization and efficiency in Europe 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers233_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 234.  
Filip Keereman (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Economic forecasts and fiscal policy in the recently acceded Member States 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers234_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 235.  
Giuseppe Carone (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Long-term labour force projections for the 25 EU Member States: A set of data for assessing the economic 
impact of ageing 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers235_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 237.  
Lars Jonung (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs), Ludger Schuknecht and Mika Tujula (ECB) 
The boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 in an international perspective 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers237_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 238.  
Alfonso Arpaia and Gilles Mourre (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Labour market institutions and labour market performance: A survey of the literature 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers238_en.htm  
 
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2002 2003 2004 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -12 -11 -5 -10 -8 -8 -7 -6 -6 
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch -0.7 0.5 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.8 -0.4   
  2002 2003 2004 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch    0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 
2 Private consumption 2002 2003 2004 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -11 -18 -14 -15 -15 -15 -15 -13 -13 
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.7 0.7 -0.4   
  2002 2003 2004 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 0.6 1.1 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.3 
3 Investment 2002 2003 2004 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 81.2 80.7 81.6 81.1 82.0 82.1 81.9 81.2 81.2 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -2.0 0.9 2.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.8 1.6 
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
4 Labour market 2002 2003 2004 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.2 8.4 8.9 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.3  
   2002 2003 2004 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6  
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 3.8 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.4  
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.2   
5 International transactions  2002 2003 2004 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -22 -24 -13 -20 -18 -18 -17 -15 -14 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 125 132  157 156 160    
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 776.9 1038.6 1142.1 100.5 103.0 106.7 107.0   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 781.6 970.4 1069.1 97.1 102.0 106.5 105.8   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -4.7 68.2 73.0 3.4 1.0 0.2 1.2   
   2002 2003 2004 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 2.1 0.6 5.9 2.7 1.3 0.5 -0.5 1.8  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 0.5 2.6 6.1 2.7 2.5 1.4 -1.4 2.3  
   2002 2003 2004 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 44.9 18.1 42.1 -0.4 -4.7 -6.6 -4.5   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -11.0 -18.4 -39.7 -9.9 -80.1 -15.0 2.1   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 64.4 -9.4 39.0 102.6 73.7 -19.5 13.9   
6 Prices  2002 2003 2004 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.4 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2.5 2.0 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 1.7 1.6 2.3 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.4   
 Import prices6.4 Ann. % ch 97.9 102.5 97.2 103.9 106.8 109.0    
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2002 2003 2004 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 3.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 4.8 4.1 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.5 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.25 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 3053 2420 2805 3152 3268 3303 3352 3344 3405 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.6 7.8 5.9 7.6 7.9 8.2 8.2   
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.7 5.0 6.0 8.0 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.8  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.95 1.13 1.24 1.22 1.20 1.23 1.23 1.20 1.18 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 95.1 106.4 109.8 107.6 108.3 109.1 108.5 108.2 107.6 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.3 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.4 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.5 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.6 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.8 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.9 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
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7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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